This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. ß 480A.08, subd. 3 (2000).






Shane Christopher Slagle, petitioner,


Minnesota Commissioner of Public Safety,


Filed March 28, 2002


Peterson, Judge


Anoka County District Court

File No. C5013731


Paul D. Baertschi, Tallen & Baertschi, 4640 IDS Center, 80 South Eighth Street, Minneapolis, MN† 55402 (for appellant)


Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Jeffrey S. Bilcik, Assistant Attorney General, 525 Park Street, Suite 500, St. Paul, MN† 55103 (for respondent)


††††††††††† Considered and decided by Crippen, Presiding Judge, Peterson, Judge, and Halbrooks, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D†† O P I N I O N


This appeal is from an order sustaining the revocation of appellant Shane Christopher Slagleís driverís license pursuant to the implied-consent law.† We affirm.



††††††††††† At approximately 12:50 a.m., Anoka County Deputy Sheriff James Dudgeon received a dispatch concerning the operation of all-terrain vehicles (ATVís) in the City of Oak Grove.† The dispatch arose from two phone calls from a resident who heard the ATVís and reported that they were disturbing the peace and were being operated in an area of new-home construction.† Dudgeon arrived at the scene, a cul-de-sac with three finished homes and two homes under construction nearby, and turned off his lights.†

After about one minute, Dudgeon heard faint sounds of ATVís and saw headlights bouncing in the woods approaching his squad car.† Dudgeon described the noise from the vehicles as ďfairly quiet.Ē† When the ATVís were 20 to 25 feet from his squad car, Dudgeon activated the overhead lights in order to stop and identify the drivers.† Dudgeon testified that he stopped ATVís as a routine practice on disturbing-the-peace calls.††

††††††††††† As soon as Dudgeon activated the overhead lights, both ATVís made abrupt U-turns and headed up a dirt driveway in an attempt to flee.† Dudgeon pursued the ATVís.† One turned into the woods, and the other went around a home on the property.† Because Dudgeon could not drive his squad car on the soft soil, he continued his pursuit on foot and soon found Slagle in the woods, where his ATV had become stuck.

Dudgeon arrested Slagle and ultimately observed indicia of intoxication.† Slagle took a breath test, which indicated an alcohol concentration of .16, and his driverís license was revoked for driving under the influence in violation of Minn. Stat. ß 169A.53, subd. 4(a) (2000).† After an implied consent hearing, the district court sustained the license revocation.†††††


The district court concluded that there was no basis to stop Slagle when Dudgeon activated his overhead lights, and, therefore, the investigatory stop of Slagle was invalid.† But the district court also concluded that Slagleís fleeing from Dudgeon, even if it was prompted by the invalid investigatory stop, was an intervening circumstance sufficient to purge the invalid stop of its primary taint and thereby make admissible the evidence of intoxication obtained after the invalid stop.†

††††††††††† The state argues that the initial stop was a valid investigatory stop.

Terry [v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868] held that the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution applies to investigative stops by the police.† Id. at 16-17, 88 S. Ct. 1868.† Terry and its progeny allow the police to conduct limited stops to investigate suspected criminal activity when the police can ďpoint to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.Ē† Id. at 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868.† To justify a stop an officer must be able to state something more than an unarticulated ďhunchĒ; the officer must be able to point to something objectively supporting that suspicion.† See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989); accord State v. Johnson, 257 N.W.2d 308, 309 (Minn. 1977).† We have stated that a Terry-type stop ďmust be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity.Ē† State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 578 (Minn. 1997) (citing United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S. Ct. 690 (1981)).† In deciding the propriety of investigative stops, we review the events surrounding the stop and consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether the police had a reasonable basis justifying the stop.† See Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417, 101 S. Ct. 690.


State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000).

Also, the factual basis for stopping a vehicle need not arise from the officerís personal observation, but may be supplied by information acquired from another person.


Marben v. State, Depít of Pub. Safety, 294 N.W.2d 697, 699 (Minn. 1980) (citations omitted).

A district courtís determination of reasonable suspicion as it relates to limited investigatory stops conducted pursuant to Terry is subject to de novo review.† State v. Munson, 594 N.W.2d 128, 135 (Minn. 1999).† The district courtís conclusion that there was no basis to stop Slagle when Dudgeon activated his overhead lights was based in part on its determination that there was no indication that Slagle had violated any statute or ordinance.† This determination, in turn, was apparently based on Dudgeonís testimony that when he observed the ATVís, they were being driven prudently, slowly, and fairly quietly.†

But Dudgeonís personal observations of the ATVís were not the only information available to Dudgeon when he activated his overhead lights.† As the district court found, Dudgeon had been dispatched to the area following a telephone call from an area resident that reported that ATVís were disturbing the peace.† To be part of the factual basis for stopping a vehicle, an informantís tip ďmust have indicia of reliability.Ē† Olson v. Commír of Pub. Safety, 371 N.W.2d 552, 556 (Minn. 1985).

Identifying information given by the informant has been recognized as an indication of reliability.† See City of Minnetonka v. Shepherd, 420 N.W.2d 887, 890 (Minn. 1988) (tip reliable when informant identified himself as station attendant at particular gas station); Playle v. Commír of Pub. Safety, 439 N.W.2d 747, 748 (Minn. App. 1989) (tip reliable when informant identified as employee of particular Burger King).† Here, the informant identified himself and said where he lived.† Also, the informant reported that ATVís in the area were disturbing the peace.

Oak Grove, Minn., Zoning Ordinance ch. 1308, subd. 18.B (1995), provides:

It is unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle in a manner so as to create a loud, unnecessary, or unusual noise which disturbs, annoys or interferes with the peace, quiet and comfort of other persons.


The informantís report that ATVís were disturbing the peace, along with Dudgeonís personal observation that ATVís were being operated in the area, objectively indicated that this city ordinance had been violated.† Considering the totality of the circumstances, Dudgeon had a reasonable basis to stop the ATVís.

Because we have concluded that the district court erred when it determined that there was no basis to stop Slagle when Dudgeon activated his overhead light, we need not address the district courtís additional conclusion that Slagleís fleeing from Dudgeon was an intervening circumstance sufficient to purge the invalid stop of its primary taint