This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2000).






Theresa Hinnenkamp, et al.,





City of Columbia Heights,





Ideal Catering, Inc., third party defendant,



Delores Burkhardt, third party defendant,



Filed February 12, 2002


Willis, Judge


Anoka County District Court

File No. C6998239


Gary T. LaFleur, Stephanie A. Riley, Babcock, Neilson, Mannella, LaFleur & Klint, 118 East Main Street, Anoka, MN  55303 (for appellants)


Jerome R. Klein, Candlin & Heck, 3800 West 80thStreet, Suite 1500, Bloomington, MN  55431-4429 (for respondent City of Columbia Heights)


Ideal Catering, Inc., 11199 Crooked Lake Blvd. NW, Coon Rapids, MN 55433 (respondent)


Allan E. Wallace, Brown & Carlson, P.A., 8085 Wayzata Boulevard, Suite 200, Minneapolis, MN  55426 (for respondent Burkhardt)

            Considered and decided by Willis, Presiding Judge, Crippen, Judge, and Anderson, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N


Appellant challenges the district court’s grant of summary judgment on her personal-injury claim, which arose from a kitchen accident at a city-owned community center.  Appellant contends that, because she was involved in a nonrecreational activity in a multipurpose building, recreational-use immunity does not apply, and even if it does, genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the trespasser exception applies.  Because we conclude it was not error for the district court to find that recreational-use immunity applies, and because there are no genuine issues of material fact as to whether the trespasser exception applies, we affirm.



             Appellant Theresa Hinnenkamp was injured while doing catering work at Muryzn Hall, a community center owned by the City of Columbia Heights and operated by its parks department.  The center is used for recreational, social, and community activities.

Hinnenkamp worked for Ideal Catering, which was hired to cater a wedding reception at the community center; during the reception Hinnenkamp was making mashed potatoes in the kitchen, using a commercial mixer owned by the city.  The mixer was on a wheeled cart, and Hinnenkamp moved the cart close to a stove and attempted to scoop water from a kettle on the stove into the mixer.  The mixer tipped and fell forward, striking the stove and spilling scalding liquids that seriously burned Hinnenkamp.

Hinnenkamp sued the city, and the district court granted summary judgment for the city on the ground of recreational-use immunity.  This appeal followed.


On appeal from summary judgment, this court asks (1) whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and (2) whether the district court erred in its application of the law.  See State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990).  No genuine issue of material fact exists when “the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party.”  DLH, Inc. v. Russ, 566 N.W.2d 60, 69 (Minn. 1997) (quotation omitted).

The availability of recreational-use immunity is a question of law, which this court reviews de novo.  See Lundstrom v. City of Apple Valley, 587 N.W.2d 517, 519 (Minn. App. 1998).  Generally, municipalities are liable for their torts.  See Minn. Stat. § 466.02 (2000).  But municipalities are immune from 

[a]ny claim based upon the * * * operation * * * of any property owned * * * by the municipality that is intended or permitted to be used as a park, as an open area for recreational purposes, or for the provision of recreational services * * * if the claim arises from a loss incurred by a user of park and recreation property or services. Nothing in this subdivision limits the liability of a municipality for conduct that would entitle a trespasser to damages against a private person.


Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6(e) (2000) (emphasis added).  Accordingly, if the municipality’s property is used to provide “recreational services,” the municipality is entitled to recreational-use immunity from a claim for a loss incurred by a user of the property unless the municipality’s conduct would entitle a trespasser to recover damages against a private person.  See Schaffer v. Spirit Mountain Recreation Area Auth., 541 N.W.2d 357, 360 (Minn. App. 1995).


The district court found that, under Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6(e), the recreational-use immunity statute, the city was immune from liability.  Hinnenkamp argues that her injury arose out of a nonrecreational activity in a multipurpose building and that the recreational-use immunity statute therefore does not apply.  But an analysis of whether recreational-use immunity applies focuses on whether the injured party was a user of recreational property, not on whether the activity involved was recreational.  See Lundstrom, 587 N.W.2d at 519 (analyzing only whether injured party was using a recreational area in finding that recreational-use immunity applied to indoor tennis court); see also Minn. Stat. § 466.03, subd. 6(e) (stating that recreational-use immunity applies “if the claim arises from a loss incurred by a user of * * * recreation property”) (emphasis added). The record supports the district court’s determination that the community center is a property “intended and permitted to be used for the provision of recreational services.” 

In arguing that section 466.03, subdivision 6(e), does not apply, Hinnenkamp asserts that as a matter of policy the statute should not apply to indoor activities.  But she cites no authority for the proposition, and, in fact, she cites cases in which this court has applied recreational-use immunity to indoor activities.  See, e.g., Lundstrom, 587 N.W.2d at 519. 

The district court did not err by applying the recreational-use immunity statute.


            Hinnenkamp also argues that “[i]f the immunity statute has this broad of a sweep, it will not pass constitutional muster as per the concerns of the court as stated in Lloyd.”  But Hinnenkamp’s argument is a single line in her brief, and she provides no legal analysis supporting this proposition.  Arguments unsupported by legal analysis should be disregarded.  Ganguli v. Univ. of Minn., 512 N.W.2d 918, 919 n.1 (Minn. App. 1994).  This court declines to reach issues in the absence of adequate briefing.  See State, Dep’t of Labor & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997).  We do not, therefore, address Hinnenkamp’s purported constitutional argument.


            Hinnenkamp also argues that, even if the recreational-use immunity statute applies, genuine issues of material fact exist regarding whether the trespasser exception to the recreational-use immunity statute applies to her case.  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 335 (1965) defines the duty owed by a municipality to users of its recreational facilities.  Johnson v. Washington County, 518 N.W.2d 594, 599 (Minn. 1994).  Under section 335, a landowner is liable for failure to warn of an artificial condition that the landowner has created or maintained only if (1) the artificial condition is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm; (2) the landowner has actual knowledge of that danger; and (3) the landowner has reason to believe that trespassers would not discover the condition.  See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 335. 

Here, the city was responsible for the fact that the mixer was on the cart, but (1) nothing in the record shows that the city was aware that the mixer on the cart was likely to cause death or serious bodily harm and (2) the mixer’s placement on the cart was plainly visible; in fact, Hinnenkamp saw that configuration and used the mixer while it was on the wheeled cart.  Therefore, we find that the district court did not err by concluding that there are no genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the trespasser exception to the recreational-use immunity statute applies.