This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2000).






Howard Thomas Ledden,





State of Minnesota,



Filed February 5, 2002

Klaphake, Judge


Ramsey County District Court

File No. K196793


Howard Thomas Ledden, MCF-Stillwater, 970 Pickett Street North, Bayport, MN  55003-1490 (appellant pro se)


Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 525 Park Avenue, Suite 500, St. Paul, MN  55103; and


Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Mark Nathan Lystig, Assistant County Attorney, 50 West Kellogg Boulevard, Suite 560, St. Paul, MN 55102-1556 (for respondent)


            Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge, Schumacher, Judge, and Klaphake, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N


            Appellant Howard Thomas Ledden was convicted for first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct in violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 609.342, subd. 1(a), .343, subd. 1(g) (1994).  The district court imposed a sentence of 294 months and 21 months to run consecutively under the career sex offender statute.  Appellant challenges his sentence under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 2362-63 (2000).  Because his sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum penalty, Apprendi does not apply, and we affirm.


Appellant argues that his due process and jury-trial rights were violated when the court enhanced his sentence.  Appellant maintains that under Apprendi the district court erred in declaring that the doctrine applies only to sentences in excess of the statutory maximum.    

            In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that

[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.


530 U.S. at 490, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63 (emphasis added).  Appellant received a total sentence of 315 months, which is less than the statutory maximum.  See Minn. Stat. § 609.342, subd. 2(a) (2000) (setting maximum sentence for first-degree criminal sexual conduct at 360 months).  Therefore, appellant’s sentence is constitutional and does not violate due process.  State v. McCoy, 631 N.W.2d 446, 451 (Minn. App. 2001) (sentence imposed under patterned sex offender statute, pursuant to findings made by sentencing judge rather than by jury, violates due process only when it exceeds statutory maximum for charged offense).

            Appellant asserts that his claim for re-sentencing is supported by the holdings of Apprendi and State v. Grossman, 622 N.W.2d 394, 399 (Minn. App. 2001), aff’d, 636 N.W.2d 545 (Minn. 2001).  The state contends that both cases are inapplicable because appellant’s sentence was not greater than the statutory maximum allowed for first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct.  We agree that appellant’s reliance on Apprendi and Grossman is misplaced.  Both case holdings are limited in application to cases in which a defendant is sentenced to a term that exceeds the statutory maximum.  Thus, the district court did not err in denying appellant’s motion to correct his sentence.