This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2000).

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

CX-01-1137

 

 

William Richard Iverson,

Appellant,

 

vs.

 

State of Minnesota,

Respondent.

 

Filed November 13, 2001

Affirmed

Lansing, Judge

 

Ramsey County District Court

File No. K3972703

 

 

William Richard Iverson, OID #127136, MCF Willow River / Moose Lake, 1000 Lakeshore Drive, Moose Lake, MN  55767-9449 (pro se appellant)

 

Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Suite 500, 525 Park St., St. Paul, MN  55103; and

 

Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Mark Nathan Lystig, Assistant County Attorney, Suite 315, 50 West Kellogg Boulevard, St. Paul, MN  55102  (for respondent)

 

Considered and decided by Lansing, Presiding Judge, Stoneburner, Judge, and Hanson, Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D  O P I N I O N

LANSING, Judge 

William Iverson pleaded guilty to first-degree assault and burglary in 1998 and directly appealed his sentence the same year.  Three years later he petitioned for postconviction relief raising additional issues relating to his sentence.  We affirm the district court's denial of postconviction relief.

F A C T S

The district court sentenced William Iverson in 1998 to 200 months for first-degree assault and to 68 concurrent months for first-degree burglary.  The assault sentence was an upward departure from the sentencing guidelines based on Iverson's history of violence and the particular cruelty of repeatedly stabbing the victim, her vulnerability, and Iverson's stalking her.  Iverson also had a previous second-degree murder conviction for causing the death of his former wife by stabbing her 64 times.

Before entering a plea, Iverson contended that he was incompetent to stand trial because he had a memory loss resulting from an alleged beating by the arresting officers.  The district court ordered a Rule 20 examination and, based on the medical evaluations, concluded that Iverson was competent to stand trial.  Iverson pleaded guilty to both charges.  At his plea hearing he told the court that he had been treated for a manic-depressive disorder and submitted an affidavit stating that he had been diagnosed with manic disorder in 1985 and that the disorder was affecting him when he assaulted and stabbed the victim.  He also told the court at sentencing that he was clear headed and understood everything that was happening.

Iverson appealed his sentence in 1998 and this court affirmed.  State v. Iverson, No. C6-98-992 (Minn. App. November 17, 1998).  In late 1999, while incarcerated, Iverson had a psychotic episode.  About a year later he was  involuntarily committed with a diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia.  In May 2001, Iverson petitioned for postconviction relief, requesting that his 200-month sentence be reduced to the 110-month guideline sentence because he was mentally ill when he committed the August 1997 offense.  The district court denied postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing. 

D E C I S I O N

Appellate courts review the decisions of a postconviction court for abuse of discretion.  Scales v. State, 620 N.W.2d 706, 707 (Minn. 2001).  If the petition, files, and records conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief, a postconviction court may dismiss the petition without an evidentiary hearing.  Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2000); Scales, 620 N.W.2dat 707-08.  Conversely, an evidentiary hearing is necessary when a dispute over material facts must be resolved to determine the issues on the merits.  State v. Rhodes, 627 N.W.2d 74, 86 (Minn. 2001).

We affirm the denial of postconviction relief for three reasons.  First, Iverson has already raised the propriety of his sentence in a direct appeal in 1998.  Any issue that has already been decided by the court of appeals or the supreme court in the same case may not be raised in a subsequent petition for postconviction relief.  Russell v. State, 562 N.W.2d 670, 672 (Minn. 1997); see also Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (2000). 

Second, a district court has the power to correct an unlawful or unauthorized sentence at any time, but its power to change a lawful sentence is limited to changes made during a stay of execution or imposition.  Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9.  Thus, once Iverson began to serve his lawfully imposed sentence in 1998, he could not obtain a modification by rearguing reasons for a lesser sentence.  State v. Hockensmith, 417 N.W.2d 630, 633 (Minn. 1988). 

Third, Iverson has not alleged facts that would entitle him to relief.  He informed the court at sentencing that he had previously suffered from a manic-depressive disorder that he believed influenced his criminal conduct.  Although he has a current diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, his affidavit states that his first psychotic episode occurred on September 14, 1999, over two years after the time of the offense.  Iverson maintains that the schizophrenia is connected to a beating he received when arrested.  But the only evidence on this claim is the statement of the examining physician at Iverson's October 2000 commitment hearing that it is highly unlikely that his schizophrenia was caused by a traumatic injury to the brain.  His current state of mental health is severe and unfortunate, but it is not relevant to the district court's 1998 sentencing.  See Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.D.2.a.(3) (mitigating factor is mental impairment “when the offense was committed”).  The postconviction court did not err in summarily denying postconviction relief.   

Affirmed.