This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. ァ 480A.08, subd. 3 (2000).

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

C1-01-412

 

Cynthia Jeanne O達rien, petitioner,

Respondent,

 

vs.

 

Patrick John O達rien,

Appellant.

 

Filed October 30, 2001

Affirmed

Kalitowski, Judge

 

Cass County District Court

File No. F100130

 

Cynthia Jeanne O達rien, 101 Meridith Drive North, Baxter, MN 56425 (pro se respondent)

 

Sjoberg & Tebelius, P.A., 2145 Woodlane Drive, Suite 101, Woodbury, MN 55125 (for appellant)

 

Considered and decided by Halbrooks, Presiding Judge, Kalitowski, Judge, and Klaphake, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

KALITOWSKI, Judge

Appellant Patrick John O達rien contends the district court abused its discretion (1) by ordering appellant to pay temporary spousal maintenance to respondent Cynthia Jeanne O達rien for six years; (2) by awarding all of the parties retirement accounts to respondent and forcing appellant to pay respondent痴 postseparation credit card debt; and (3) by ordering appellant to pay respondent痴 attorney fees. We affirm.

D E C I S I O N

 

I.

This court reviews a district court痴 maintenance award under an abuse of discretion standard. Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1997); Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn. 1982). For this court to conclude the district court abused its broad discretion with respect to an award of spousal maintenance, the district court痴 factual findings must be 殿gainst logic and the facts on [the] record.箱 Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984) (citation omitted).

Appellant contends that the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay spousal maintenance without examining all the factors outlined in Minn. Stat. ァ 518.552 (2000). Specifically, appellant contends the court made only conclusory and incomplete findings regarding respondent痴 ability to become self-supporting, respondent痴 standard of living during the marriage, and respondent痴 loss of earning capacity, seniority, retirement, or employment opportunities. We disagree.

When determining the amount and duration of maintenance, the district court must consider the factors in Minn. Stat. ァ 518.552, subd. 2, but the key issue in setting maintenance

is the financial need of the spouse receiving maintenance, and the ability to meet that need, balanced against the financial condition of the spouse providing the maintenance.

 

Novick v. Novick, 366 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Minn. App. 1985) (citation omitted). In its findings, the district court noted:

[Respondent] does not have sufficient property, including the marital property which is being apportioned to her in this proceeding to provide for her reasonable needs considering the standard of living that the parties established during the marriage and is unable to provide adequate self support through her employment. [Appellant] is able to contribute to the support of [respondent] * * * .

 

These findings address respondent痴 standard of living and the key factors identified in Novick, 366 N.W.2d at 334. Moreover, the court addressed respondent痴 loss of earnings, retirement, and employment opportunities when it noted, 甜respondent] spent a good portion of the parties marriage in the role of a traditional mother and homemaker caring for the parties children.箱 Finally, the court addressed respondent痴 ability to become self-sufficient when it found respondent 電oes not have [the] education or work experience qualifying her for significantly greater income producing work at the present time.箱 Because the court satisfactorily addressed the key factors from Novick as well as the factors appellant claims were inadequate, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion.

II.

A district court has 澱road discretion over the division of marital property, and on appeal we will not disturb the division 殿bsent a clear abuse of discretion.箱 Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 615 N.W.2d 405, 412 (Minn. App. 2000) (citation omitted), review denied (Minn. Oct. 25, 2000). On appeal, this court will

affirm the [district] court痴 division of property if it had an acceptable basis in fact and principle even though this court may have taken a different approach.

 

Servin v. Servin, 345 N.W.2d 754, 758 (Minn. 1984) (citations omitted). Also, the division of property 渡eed not be mathematically equal; it need only be just and equitable.箱 Lynch v. Lynch, 411 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. App. 1987) (citation omitted), review denied (Minn. Oct. 30, 1987).

Appellant contends the district court abused its discretion by impermissibly speculating on the value of appellant痴 stock in the business he manages and respondent痴 limited ability to develop retirement funds. We disagree.

Because the district court痴 conclusion was supported by facts, it was not an abuse of discretion. One of appellant痴 witnesses testified that the business appellant had stock in had a significant total value to the point that he had been advised on ways to avoid death taxes on it. Moreover, the district court had the business痴 tax returns and a valuation from which to base a decision. Thus, the court痴 determination that the business had a significant value was not against logic or the facts on record.

In addition, the district court found, and the record supports, that respondent had little room for advancement in her present position and that her monthly expenses far exceed her earnings. From these findings, we conclude that the court痴 finding on respondent痴 limited ability to develop retirement funds was not an abuse of discretion.

Appellant further contends that the district court abused its discretion by ordering him to pay respondent痴 postseparation credit card debt. He argues that respondent received enough money and property in the settlement to pay this debt herself. We disagree.

The district court made findings on the parties incomes and standards of living, so it examined the information necessary to make a determination concerning respondent痴 debts. Moreover, appellant offers no evidence showing the district court痴 decision was not equitable. Because the decision was not against logic or the facts on record, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion.

III.

An award of attorney fees under Minn. Stat. ァ 518.14, subd. 1 (2000), 途ests almost entirely within the discretion of the [district] court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.箱 Crosby v. Crosby, 587 N.W.2d 292, 298 (Minn. App. 1998) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 1999); see also Katz v. Katz, 408 N.W.2d 835, 840 (Minn. 1987).

A district court shall award attorney fees, costs, and disbursements if it finds

(1) that the fees are necessary for the good-faith assertion of the party痴 rights in the proceeding and will not contribute unnecessarily to the length and expense of the proceeding;

(2) that the party from whom fees, costs, and disbursements are sought has the means to pay them; and

(3) that the party to whom fees, costs, and disbursements are awarded does not have the means to pay them.

 

Minn. Stat. ァ 518.14, subd. 1. Although the district court failed to make explicit findings on the statutory factors, in Geske, this court noted that

a lack of specific findings on the statutory factors for a need-based fee award under Minn. Stat. ァ 518.14, subd. 1, is not fatal to an award where review of the order reasonably implies that the district court considered the relevant factors and where the district court was familiar with the history of the case and had access to the parties financial records.

 

Geske v. Marcolina, 624 N.W.2d 813, 817 (Minn. App. 2001) (quotation omitted). Because the district court痴 findings and order reasonably imply that the court considered the relevant factors and the district court had access to the parties financial records, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion.

Affirmed.