This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2000).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
John Lee Battle, petitioner,
Commissioner of Public Safety,
Hennepin County District Court
File No. 478509
Leonardo Castro, Hennepin County Public Defender, Peter W. Gorman, Assistant Public Defender, 317 Second Avenue South, Suite 200, Minneapolis, MN 55401 (for appellant)
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Jeffrey F. Lebowski, Sean McCarthy, Assistant Attorneys General, 525 Park Street, Suite 500, St. Paul, MN 55103 (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Toussaint, Chief Judge, Randall, Judge, and Kalitowski, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
Appellant John Lee Battle challenges the revocation of his license contending the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress because collateral estoppel barred respondent Commissioner of Public Safety from contesting the legality of the stop and the police did not have a sufficient basis to stop him. We affirm.
Appellant contends that collateral estoppel prevents the district court from issuing inconsistent decisions regarding the legality of a stop based on the same facts. But appellant did not raise this argument in the district court. Generally, a failure to raise an argument in the district court waives review on appeal. Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988); Weierke v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 578 N.W.2d 815, 816 (Minn. App. 1998). Because appellant did not raise this argument below, it is not properly before us.
Moreover, even if we were to address appellant’s argument, collateral estoppel would not apply here because the case relied on by appellant, State v. Victorsen, specifically stated that its holding was prospective and thus it would not apply to appellant. State v. Victorsen, 627 N.W.2d 655, 663-64 (Minn. App. 2001).
Appellant also contends that the district court erred in determining that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. “In reviewing a district court’s determinations of the legality of a limited investigatory stop, we review questions of reasonable suspicion de novo.” State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000) (citation omitted).
Respondent contends that the stop was proper because the police officer observed appellant violate a traffic law. Ordinarily, a violation of a traffic law, however insignificant, justifies a limited stop. See, e.g., State v. Haataja, 611 N.W.2d 353, 355 (Minn. App. 2000) (holding that unnecessary and unusually slow driving resulting in traffic backup supported stop), review denied (Minn. July 25, 2000). Cf. State v. Varnado, 582 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1998) (agreeing that the police had probable cause to stop Varnado’s vehicle because the windshield was shattered; a traffic violation).
Here, the police officer stopped appellant because he observed appellant making a wide left turn. “Whenever practicable [a] left turn shall be made in that portion of the intersection to the left of the center of the intersection.” Minn. Stat. § 169.19, subd. 1(b) (2000). Appellant concedes that he took a wide turn but he suggests that a remand is necessary so the district court can determine if it was “practicable” for him to have turned into the lane closest to the centerline. We disagree. The police officer further testified that there was nothing obstructing appellant’s ability to pull into the lane closest to the centerline. And the district court adopted this testimony in its findings of fact. See Britton, 604 N.W.2d at 87 (stating that our court reviews the district court’s findings of fact for clear error). Thus, no remand is necessary because the traffic violation provided a sufficient basis for the stop.