This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2000).
IN COURT OF APPEALS
South Valley Investment Company,
Olmsted County District Court
File No. C1003130
Thomas A. Thistle, Masonic Lodge Building, Suite 7, 2002 Second Street SW, Rochester, MN 55902 (for respondent)
Mangor Krogstad, 314 21st Street NW, Stewartville, MN 55976 (appellant pro se)
Considered and decided by Hanson, Presiding Judge, Willis, Judge, and Halbrooks, Judge.
Pro se appellant challenges the district court’s eviction of appellant under Minn. Stat. ch. 327C (2000). Appellant argues that (1) a maintenance rule adopted by respondent-landlord after appellant signed his rental agreement that was the basis for his eviction was unenforceable because it was unreasonable and a substantial modification of the lease; (2) the record does not support the landlord’s allegations regarding the condition of appellant’s property; and (3) the eviction presents constitutional questions regarding equal protection, takings, First Amendment, and privacy. Because the district court did not err and the constitutional arguments fail for lack of state action, we affirm.
Appellant Mangor Krogstad and his wife Joyce Krogstad leased a lot in the Southern Hills Community mobile-home park from respondent South Valley Investment Company. Along with a rental agreement, residents of Southern Hills Community sign an acknowledgment of the park’s rules and regulations. The document states that the rules may be changed periodically in accordance with state and federal law. Appellant signed the rental agreement on July 30, 1998.
On January 24, 2000, respondent amended the rules and regulations. Southern Hills rule Addendum 4A declares that residents are “responsible for the maintenance of their home and related structures * * * .” The term “related structures” is defined to include sheds and decks. The addendum defines maintenance as “painting, replacing siding or skirting, installing railing on decks or steps * * * .”
A notice dated June 23, 2000, advised appellant that an inspection of his lot revealed non-compliance with Addendum 4A. On August 18, appellant was given a 30-day notice to correct the problems or vacate the site for failure to repair his house, deck, and shed. On October 3, 2000, respondent filed an unlawful-detainer complaint, noting that appellant had broken the terms of the lease agreement by “refusing to complete home/shed” maintenance.
On December 4, 2000, the district court directed appellant to make the requested improvements by March 31, 2001, or a writ for restitution of the premises would be ordered in favor of respondent. On April 2, 2001, respondent’s attorney filed an affidavit stating that appellant had not complied with the court order. He included photographs of the alleged problem areas. Appellant was served with a writ of restitution in unlawful detainer. This appeal follows.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant argues that the district court’s failure to make findings to support respondent’s allegations of the rule violations is reversible error. The district court did not make any factual findings but concluded in its order that Addendum 4A is reasonable and that appellant had to comply with the rules by March 31, 2001, or face a writ of restitution. The failure to make findings is not error. There is no statutory requirement that the order be supported by findings. A park owner may recover possession of land if a resident fails to comply with a rule of the park within 30 days after receiving notice of the noncompliance. Minn. Stat. § 327C.09, subds. 1, 4 (2000). In such an action, if a court finds a rule to be reasonable and not a substantial modification, it “shall” rule in favor of the park owner. Minn. Stat. § 327C.02, subd. 2a (2000). Here, a review of the limited record reveals that appellant was given notice of noncompliance with the rules and a 30-day period within which to cure the violation. An uncontested affidavit submitted by respondent indicates that appellant failed to do so. Because the statutory procedure was followed, the order is valid.
Appellant argues that the district court erred when it found that Addendum 4A is reasonable and not a substantial modification of the original lease agreement. Statutory construction is a question of law subject to de novo review. Wynkoop v. Carpenter, 574 N.W.2d 422, 425 (Minn. 1998).
The statute that governs manufactured-home-park rental lots provides that
[a] rule adopted or amended after the resident initially enters into a rental agreement may be enforced against that resident only if the new or amended rule is reasonable and is not a substantial modification of the original agreement.
Minn. Stat. § 327C.02, subd. 2 (2000). A “reasonable” rule must “promote the good appearance” of the mobile-home park and cannot be “retaliatory” or “unjustifiably discriminatory in nature.” Minn. Stat. § 327C.01, subd. 8(a), (c) (2000). In addition, a “substantial modification”
means any change in a rule which: (a) significantly diminishes or eliminates any material obligation of the park owner; (b) significantly diminishes or eliminates any material right, privilege or freedom of action of a resident; or (c) involves a significant new expense for a resident.
Minn. Stat. § 327C.01, subd. 11 (2000). Although requiring appellant to repair his home and shed may involve some expense,
[a] rule change requiring all residents to maintain their homes, sheds and other appurtenances in good repair and safe condition shall not be deemed a substantial modification of a rental agreement.
Minn. Stat. § 327C.02, subd. 2. Because Addendum 4A simply requires residents to maintain their homes, decks, and sheds to meet “reasonable standards for appearance and general condition,” it falls directly within the statutory language of Minn. Stat. § 327C.02, subd. 2. The legislature has established that such a rule amendment is not a substantial modification. Therefore, it can be enforced against appellant. The district court did not err in its finding that Addendum 4A is reasonable.
Finally, appellant has made three constitutional-rights-violation arguments: (1) that forcing him to paint his home is a violation of equal protection because it is “discriminatory;” (2) that the addendum is a “taking” because it takes away the owner’s right to do as he wishes; and (3) that there may be First Amendment or privacy issues at stake.
But appellant fails to recognize that respondent is a private actor not subject to the same constitutional requirements as a governmental entity. See State v. Wicklund, 589 N.W.2d 793, 801 (Minn. 1999) (holding that private conduct is not subject to constitutional restrictions unless it is “entwined with governmental character”) (quoting Brennan v. Minneapolis Soc’y for the Blind, Inc., 282 N.W.2d 515, 524 (Minn. 1979)). Because there is no evidence of state action or that respondent is “entwined with governmental character” and appellant’s challenge is to the rule of a private organization, his constitutional arguments fail. See State by Humphrey v. Modern Recycling, Inc., 558 N.W.2d 770, 772 (Minn. App. 1997) (assignment of error in brief based on “mere assertion” and not supported by argument or authority is waived) (quoting Schoepke v. Alexander Smith & Sons Carpet Co., 290 Minn. 518, 519-20, 187 N.W.2d 133, 135 (1971)).
 Although Mangor and Joyce Krogstad were both defendants in the underlying action, only Mangor Krogstad appealed.
 Appellant put forth a cursory argument that respondent wants to evict him because he is a member and officer of the Southern Hills Mobile Home Park Tenants’ Association. But nothing in the record supports a claim of retaliatory eviction or indicates that this argument was raised at the trial court. See Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582-83 (Minn. 1988) (issues not argued should not be considered); Ganguli v. University of Minn., 512 N.W.2d 918, 919-20 n.1 (Minn. App. 1994) (courts may decline to address allegations unsupported by legal analysis or citation).