This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2000).






In Re the Marriage of:


Jean Louise Peltier,

f/k/a Jean Louise Anderson, petitioner,





Kevin Theodore Peltier,



Filed August 21, 2001


Kalitowski, Judge


Washington County District Court

File No. F8982416


Edward E. Simonet, III, P.O. Box 16, 522 South Fourth Street, Stillwater, MN 55082; and


Sharon L. Buffington, 708 Vine Street, Hudson, WI 54016 (for respondent)


Kevin Theodore Peltier, 13094 Goodview Avenue, White Bear Lake, MN 55110 (pro se appellant)



            Considered and decided by Kalitowski, Presiding Judge, Klaphake, Judge, and Halbrooks, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N


            Appellant Kevin Peltier challenges the district court’s order authorizing the sale of property included in a marital-dissolution property settlement, alleging erroneous findings, fraud, bad faith dealings by respondent, and bias by the district court.  Appellant also challenges the district court’s award of attorney fees to respondent.  We affirm.




Generally the district court may not modify a division of property after entry of the original judgment.  Erickson v. Erickson, 452 N.W.2d 253, 255 (Minn. App. 1990).  But the court “may issue appropriate orders implementing or enforcing specific provisions of the dissolution decree.”  Id. (citation omitted); see also Hanson v. Hanson, 379 N.W.2d 230, 233 (Minn. App. 1985) (court converted one party’s share of parties’ personal property to a cash award after parties were unable to physically divide up property); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 374 N.W.2d 517, 519 (Minn. App. 1985) (court replaced former husband who was real estate agent selling parties’ home with a neutral realtor when parties could not agree on sale price or other terms of sale).   

Appellant contends that the district court abused its discretion in ordering the sale of the homestead property in question because he was denied his first option to purchase respondent’s interest as required in the original judgment and decree.  We disagree.  Upon dissolution of the parties’ marriage, the court granted the parties a tenancy-in-common interest in the homestead property (included home and 10 acres) and in an additional 105 acres.  The decree also directed that if either party sold his or her interest in the properties, the other party would have the first option to buy.  Respondent wanted to sell her interest in the homestead property.  Appellant made various offers, but as the district court found, one was made with a variety of conditions, one was based on a payment plan, and one was limited to three acres and did not approximate what respondent’s interest was worth.  We conclude that the district court’s finding that appellant did not properly exercise his first option is supported by the record and not clearly erroneous.  See Minn. R. Civ. P. 52.01 (stating findings of fact are not set aside unless clearly erroneous). 

Because appellant failed to exercise his first option, the district court issued an order implementing the provision of the dissolution decree allowing respondent to sell her interest in the property.  Appellant received an “offsetting adjustment in the future distribution of proceeds from the development and sale of the parties’ [other property] as compensation for his one-half interest in the homestead property.”  Thus, the order did not affect the parties’ substantive rights because what each party received under the original decree remained the same.  We conclude that the order was well within the court’s discretion, and we will not disturb it on appeal. 

Appellant next contends the judgment was erroneous because respondent and her attorney perpetrated fraud on the district court and now this court.  But appellant never presented a claim of fraud to the district court.  Appellant also argues that respondent and her attorney dealt in bad faith with him during the negotiations to purchase respondent’s interest in the property by listing the house and ten acres with a realtor in violation of an earlier district court order.  But the district court’s order of January 24, 2001, to which our review is limited, does not address any such claim.  Generally, this court will not consider matters not argued and decided below.  Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (holding appellate review limited to issues “presented [to] and considered by” the district court (quotation and citation omitted)).  Therefore, we decline to review these issues.  

Finally, appellant argues for the first time in his reply brief that the district court judge was biased and discriminatory and requests the judge’s dismissal from the case.  “The reply brief must be confined to new matter raised in the brief of the respondent.”  Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 128.02, subd. 3; see also McIntire v. State, 458 N.W.2d 714, 717 n.2 (Minn. App. 1990) (stating that issues not raised or argued in initial brief “cannot be revived” in a reply brief), review denied (Minn. Sept. 28, 1990).  Thus, we will not review this issue.


            Appellant challenges the award of attorney fees to respondent.  This court issued an order on May 17, 2001, accepting jurisdiction over the attorney fees issue “conditioned on appellant filing a certified copy of a judgment for the attorney fees award by June 4, 2001.”  Appellant did not file a certified copy of the judgment.  Therefore, we will not review the award of attorney fees.