This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2000).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
In Re the Marriage of:
Warren Daniel Springer, petitioner,
Rona Rae Springer,
Toussaint, Chief Judge
Rice County District Court
File No. F4931571
Considered and decided by Toussaint, Chief Judge, Kalitowski, Judge, and Lindberg, Judge.*
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
TOUSSAINT, Chief Judge
Appellant Warren Springer and respondent Rona Springer were divorced in 1994 pursuant to a judgment and decree that ordered appellant to pay respondent temporary rehabilitative spousal maintenance for 48 months and child support. In 1998, respondent moved the district court for permanent spousal maintenance or an extension of the 1994 award of rehabilitative spousal maintenance. The district court granted an extension of the rehabilitative spousal maintenance for an additional 24 months. It also reduced appellant’s obligation to provide life insurance. In 2000, respondent again moved the district court for an award of permanent spousal maintenance. Respondent’s motion was denied, but the district court extended the rehabilitative spousal maintenance for an additional year and terminated appellant’s life insurance obligation. The same district court judge presided over the dissolution and heard motions.
Appellant challenges the district court’s extension of temporary spousal maintenance for an additional year. Respondent challenges the district court’s decision (1) denying her request for permanent spousal maintenance; (2) terminating appellant’s obligation to provide life insurance security to secure the child support and spousal maintenance; and (3) denying her request for attorney fees. We affirm.
D E C I S I O N
Appellant challenges the district court’s extension of temporary spousal maintenance for an additional year. Respondent challenges the district court’s denial of her request for permanent spousal maintenance.
Determination of spousal maintenance is a matter within the district court's discretion, which we will not disturb on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Erlandson v. Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d 36, 38 (Minn. 1982). “There must be a clearly erroneous conclusion that is against logic and the facts on record before this court will find that the trial court abused its discretion.” Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984).
A. Extension of Temporary Spousal Maintenance
Appellant claims the district court abused its discretion in extending his obligation to pay temporary spousal maintenance for an additional year. While respondent was seeking an award of permanent spousal maintenance, the district court denied her request, and instead, extended the temporary spousal maintenance for one year.
A district court may modify spousal maintenance upon a showing of substantially increased or decreased earnings of a party that makes the terms of the original decree unreasonable and unfair. Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2 (2000). Here, the district court concluded that because respondent had not finished all the credits required to earn an L.D. and E.B.D., she was not fully self-supporting and, therefore, there was a substantial change in circumstances. This conclusion is supported by the record. See Maeder v. Maeder, 480 N.W.2d 677, 679 (Minn. App. 1992), review denied (Minn. Mar. 19, 1992) (stating that spouse’s failure to become fully rehabilitated while receiving temporary spousal maintenance, is, in itself, a changed circumstance under Minn. Stat. § 518.64 (2000)) (quoting Katter v. Katter, 457 N.W.2d 750, 753 (Minn. App. 1990).
Once the district court finds that modification is appropriate, it must determine the appropriate amount and duration of the award by applying the factors set out in Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 2 (2000). Rapacke v. Rapacke, 442 N.W.2d 340, 343 (Minn. App. 1989). The district court found that respondent has a net monthly income of $2,013.51. In addition, it found that respondent receives monthly child support of $849.13, which will cease in June of 2001, and has been receiving rehabilitative spousal maintenance of $420 per month. The record shows that respondent’s rehabilitative spousal maintenance will cease in September of 2000.
The district court also found that at this time, respondent is not fully self-supporting, which was the goal of the 1994 judgment and decree. The district court found that while respondent has a provisional license to teach L.D., she still has to complete 4 credits to obtain her L.D. degree and 10 credits to get her E.B.D. to continue teaching. It noted that while the initial judgment and decree contemplated that she would become certified to teach special education, her inability to become fully certified has been caused by her child care responsibilities and some emotional health issues. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the district court acted within its discretion in extending temporary spousal maintenance.
B. Denial of Permanent Spousal Maintenance
Respondent contends the district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion to modify the dissolution judgment to provide for permanent spousal maintenance. Section 518.64 governs when a party seeks to modify temporary maintenance to permanent maintenance due to the party's inability to become fully rehabilitated under the temporary order. Katter, 457 N.W.2d at 753. A party's failure to rehabilitate may constitute a substantial change in circumstances that warrants modification. Id.
The appellate court will not alter maintenance awards unless the district court abused its “wide discretion.” Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d at 38. But when a party moves to modify maintenance and extend the duration of the award, the court must consider all relevant factors, including the factors for an initial award of maintenance that exist at the time of the motion. Minn. Stat. § 518.64, subd. 2(c) (referring to factors under Minn. Stat. § 518.552).
Minn. State. § 518.552, subd. 2, sets forth factors to be considered in determining the duration of spousal maintenance. Where there is uncertainty as to whether a permanent award is necessary, the district court must order permanent maintenance but retain jurisdiction for later modification. Minn. Stat. § 518.552, subd. 3 (2000). There is no bright line rule for determining when permanent maintenance is appropriate. Rather, each case must be determined on its facts. See Dobrin v. Dobrin, 569 N.W.2d 199, 203 (Minn. 1997); see also Erlandson, 318 N.W.2d at 39. Because, here, there was ample evidence in the record to support the district court’s decision to deny respondent’s request for permanent spousal maintenance, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant’s request.
Respondent also argues that the district court erred in terminating appellant’s obligation to pay life insurance to secure payment of child support and spousal maintenance. Requiring some form of security for spousal maintenance is generally limited to cases where there is permanent spousal maintenance, a marriage of long duration, and the dependent spouse's age and lack of marketable skills justify it. Arundel v. Arundel, 281 N.W.2d 663, 667 (Minn. 1979); Walker v. Walker, 553 N.W.2d 90, 96 (Minn. App. 1996). The district court has the discretion to determine “whether the circumstances justifying an award of maintenance also justify securing it with life insurance.” Laumann v. Laumann, 400 N.W.2d 355, 360 (Minn. App. 1987), review denied (Minn. Nov. 24, 1987).
In the 1994 judgment and decree, the district court ordered appellant to maintain life insurance to secure payment of child support and spousal maintenance. The record indicates that at the time of the initial order, respondent had not worked in the field of special education for 20 years and had no marketable skills. Appellant’s obligation to maintain life insurance was renewed in 1998, albeit at a lesser amount. In 1998, respondent had just begun a job and was beginning to work on her degree credits. However, there is no reason for the security to be continued. Respondent was denied permanent spousal maintenance, and the record strongly indicates that she does not lack marketable skills—respondent has been working as a special education teacher since 1997 and has almost completed her required degree credits. In light of these circumstances and the broad discretion afforded to the district court in determining whether to order security, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in terminating appellant’s obligation to pay life insurance security.
Finally, respondent contends the district court abused its discretion by refusing to award her attorney fees. An award of attorney fees under Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1 (2000), “rests almost entirely within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Crosby v. Crosby, 587 N.W.2d 292, 298 (Minn. App. 1998) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. Feb. 18, 1999). A district court may award attorney fees when it finds that an award is necessary for a party to assert his or her rights in an action, that the payor has the financial means to pay the fees, and that the payee lacks the means to pay the fees. Minn. Stat. § 518.14, subd. 1. In light of the broad discretion afforded to the district court in deciding whether to award attorney fees, we find no error in its decision to deny respondent’s request for attorney fees.
* Retired judge of the district court, serving as judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
 In the past, there have been questions regarding whether a section 518.64 analysis (modification of spousal maintenance), rather than a 518.552 analysis (award of spousal maintenance) is required where the spouse wishes to extend a temporary spousal maintenance award. See Katter v. Katter, 457 N.W.2d 750, 752 (Minn. App. 1990). Katter explained that where the initial judgment and decree contains provisions which permit future consideration of extension of maintenance without changed circumstances, a section 518.64 analysis is not necessary. Id. at 753. But, where as here there is no such indication, a section 518.64 analysis is necessary. Id.