This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2000).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
State of Minnesota,
Brian Lee Efta,
Scott County District Court
File No. K9818058
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 525 Park Street, Suite 500, St. Paul, MN 55103; and
Thomas J. Harbinson, Scott County Attorney, Susan K. McNellis, Assistant County Attorney, 200 West Fourth Avenue, Shakopee, MN 55379-1220 (for respondent)
John Stuart, State Public Defender, Jodie L. Carlson, Assistant State Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue Southeast, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Schumacher, Presiding Judge, Kalitowski, Judge, and Stoneburner, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
Appellant Brian Lee Efta challenges his sentence for first-degree controlled substance offense, contending the district court erred in finding he breached his plea agreement. We affirm.
A district court has broad sentencing discretion and we will not reverse its exercise of discretion absent clear abuse. State v. Lundberg, 575 N.W.2d 589, 591 (Minn. App. 1998), review denied (Minn. May 20, 1998). Only in a “rare” case will a reviewing court reverse a district court’s imposition of the presumptive sentence. State v. Kindem, 313 N.W.2d 6, 7 (Minn. 1981).
Appellant contends the district court abused its discretion in declining to reduce his presumptive sentence by 24 months pursuant to the plea agreement. We disagree. “Once a court accepts a plea containing a sentencing agreement, the terms of the agreement normally should be fulfilled.” State v. Pearson, 479 N.W.2d 401, 405 (Minn. App. 1991) (citation omitted), review denied (Minn. Feb. 10, 1992). But, upon “demonstration that a plea agreement has been breached,” the district court does not have to honor it. State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (citations omitted). In deciding whether a plea agreement has been violated, a district court looks to “what the parties to [the] plea bargain reasonably understood to be the terms of the agreement.” Id. (alteration in original) (quotation omitted). Here, under the plea agreement, appellant agreed to: (1) cooperate fully with the Drug Task Force; (2) be truthful and honest with all agents; (3) meet at agents’ requests; (4) provide complete answers to questions asked by the Drug Task Force; (5) provide information as to source of raw materials; (6) provide information regarding who taught appellant how to cook methamphetamine; (7) provide information as to Cheryl Hemmick’s use for all the purchases of pseudoephedrine; and (8) provide information about any and all methamphetamine distribution of which appellant was aware. The district court found that appellant violated two terms of the agreement by being dishonest with agents and not fully cooperating with the Drug Task Force.
On May 25, 2000, appellant told agents that he would not be able to purchase drugs from a certain individual because he no longer had contact with this person. But after making this statement, a task force agent observed appellant at this individual’s residence. Appellant also lied to his probation agent on August 15, 2000, by stating that he had not used methamphetamine in five months when he had previously admitted to a task force agent that he used methamphetamine on or about May 25, 2000.
In addition, a task force agent testified that appellant had not cooperated fully with the Drug Task Force. Appellant conceded that he did not offer information to the task force on his own initiative, but instead, only offered information after being asked a question by an agent. And after the first meeting in May 2000 between appellant and task force agents, appellant never contacted them again.
Because evidence in the record supports the district court’s finding that appellant breached the plea agreement by being untruthful and not fully cooperating with the Drug Task Force, the court was not required to honor the agreement. State v. Rud, 372 N.W.2d 434, 435 (Minn. App. 1985), review denied (Minn. Sept. 26, 1985). Nothing in the record indicates that partial compliance was sufficient to satisfy the plea agreement. We conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion in imposing a sentence within the presumptive range of the sentencing guidelines.