This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2000).






State of Minnesota,





Arthur Dale Senty-Haugen,



Filed April 10, 2001


Harten, Judge


Carlton County District Court

File No. K7-99-1023


Mike Hatch, Attorney General, Alison Eckstein Colton, Assistant Attorney General, 525 Park Street, Suite 500, St. Paul, MN 55103 (for respondent)


Thomas M. Skare, Newby, Lindgren, Skare & Westermann, 1219 Fourteenth Street, P.O. Box 760, Cloquet, MN 55720 (for appellant)


            Considered and decided by Hanson, Presiding Judge, Crippen, Judge, and Harten, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N


Appellant argues that the district court erred in denying him jail credit for time spent in restricted circumstances during his commitment.  Because we see no error in the denial, we affirm.



            Appellant Arthur Dale Senty-Haugen was committed indefinitely to the Minnesota State Psychopathic Personality Treatment Center (MSPPTC).  See In re Senty-Haugen, 583 N.W.2d 266 (Minn. 1998) (affirming appellant’s indefinite commitment).  While there, he committed and was arrested for theft and financial fraud; he was then taken to the Carlton County Law Enforcement Center.  He posted bail and was returned to the MSPPTC where he was subject to certain restrictive bail conditions:  (1) no telephone use except for attorney-client communication; (2) all mail except attorney-client reviewed by MSPPTC staff; (3) no computer access; (4) no in-person contact with two relatives, Holly Senty-Haugen and Dale Arthur Senty-Haugen; (5) monitoring of all personal contact at MSPPTC except for attorney-client contact.  In November 1999, the conditions were modified to permit contact with appellant’s civil commitment defense attorney. 

            In February 2000, appellant moved to lift all bail conditions.  For various reasons, no hearing was held on this motion.  Appellant raised the motion again, however, at the August 2000 hearing on the merits when he pleaded guilty to four charges of theft and related fraud.  After hearing arguments on the motion from counsel, the district court found:

            [T]he Court’s prior [o]rder dated October 14th [1999] and the memorandum that’s attached thereto sets forth the specific reasons why these restrictions are required in this case.  * * * [G]iven the fact that these offense[s] were committed in what [appellant’s counsel] has deemed to be a secured facility, extraordinary measures must be taken to make sure that there is no re-offense and no further violations of the law.  Therefore, at this time, the Court’s going to continue the restrictions as they are.


The matter of the bail conditions was revisited at the September 2000 sentencing hearing in connection with whether appellant would receive jail credit for the time he spent while subject to the conditions during commitment.  The district court compared the bail conditions placed on appellant to

pre-trial release[s] where we restrict the use of alcohol, drugs, we have no-contact orders, we have situations involving [ ] sexual perpetrators that are only alleged [and not] convicted, where [we] say no contact with any children under a certain age.  Again, these people haven’t even been convicted yet.  [We] place them on electronic monitoring sometimes, intensive supervision; [we] enjoin them from going back to the scene of the crime. * * * [T]here’s all kinds of restrictions that courts impose pre-trial[.]


* * * *


And since [appellant is] back at the facility and * * * the allegations are that he utilized computer, mail, in-person contacts, telephone contacts, to perpetrate the crimes, it seems to me that’s absolutely no different using those as a means of [setting conditions for] pre-trial release * * *.


* * * *


The Court deems that the restrictions were appropriate given the alleged crimes.  And they are no different than any of the other pre-trial release types of restrictions that we apply in situations. * * * * So I deny the calculation of credit for any time served at the [MSPPTC].


Appellant challenges the denial of jail credit while he was on restricted status at MSPPTC. [1]


            “The granting of jail credit is not discretionary with the trial court.” State v. Parr, 414 N.W.2d 776, 778 (Minn. App. 1987) (citation omitted), review denied (Minn. Jan. 15, 1988).  Therefore, this court considers whether the district court erred in denying jail credit.  See State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d 539, 545 (Minn. 1994) (holding that district court did not err in failing to give credit for time served in a Probation Offender’s Rehabilitation Training Program). 

            It is undisputed that only time spent in correctional facilities is to be given jail credit; time spent “in residential treatment facilities” is not entitled to credit.  Minn. Sent. Guidelines Cmt. III.C.04; see also State v. Marti, 372 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Minn. App. 1985) (citing State v. Peterson, 359 N.W.2d 708, 710 (Minn. App. 1984), review denied (Minn. Mar. 13, 1985), and noting that “[w]e have already held that one is not entitled to jail credit for time spent in treatment * * *.”), review denied (Minn. Oct. 11, 1985); Peterson, 359 N.W.2d at 710 (“[a]ppellant is not entitled to credit for time spent receiving therapy at St. Peter as a condition of probation”).

Appellant argues that, once restrictions were imposed on him in a residential treatment facility, the treatment facility became a de facto correctional facility, entitling him to jail credit for time spent there.  But Peterson explicitly rejected as irrelevant the argument that, because there are certain similarities between a treatment and a correctional facility, confinement in a treatment facility entitles one to credit for jail time.  Id.  Appellant was restricted at MSPPTC as a condition of bail while the appellant in Peterson was committed for treatment as a condition of probation, but this difference is not a meaningful distinction of Peterson.  The district court’s stated rationale for the imposition of restrictive bail conditions here is not unlike the routine practice of most judges, to wit, crafting and imposing conditions designed to prevent repetition of the acts that resulted in criminal charges before the court.  See Minn. R. Crim. P. 5.05.  Appellant cites no authority whereby this common practice triggers the award of jail credit.

            Appellant relies on State v. Bonafide, 457 N.W.2d 211 (Minn. App. 1990), but his reliance is misplaced.  Bonafide involved a defendant arrested on criminal charges, first determined to be not competent to stand trial, then committed to a treatment facility that, after 68 days, determined he was competent to stand trial, then tried and sentenced.  This court held he was entitled to credit for the 68 days because it was “custodial time connected to the offense or behavioral incident for which sentence was imposed.”  Id. at 211.  Here, appellant’s commitment had no connection to the theft and fraud offenses for which his sentence was imposed; it resulted from his status as a sexual offender.  Senty-Haugen, 583 N.W.2d  at 266-68. 

            We see no error in the district court’s denial of jail credit for time appellant spent at MSPPTC.


[1] Appellant devotes portions of his brief to arguing that the restrictions deprived him of due process and equal protection and that his bail is excessive.  Because none of those issues were determined in the order from which this appeal is taken, they are not before this court.