This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2000).
State of Minnesota,
William Nelson Schenk, III,
Morrison County District Court
File No. K800485
John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Lawrence Hammerling, Esq., Deputy Public Defender, Michael F. Cromett, Esq., Assistant Public Defender, 2829 University Avenue Southeast, Suite 600, Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for Appellant)
Michael Hatch, Esq. Attorney General, Robert A. Stanich, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, 525 Park Street, Suite 500, St. Paul, MN 55155; and
Conrad Freedberg, Esq., Morrison County Attorney, Government Center, 213 Southeast First Avenue, Little Falls, MN 56345 (for Respondent)
Considered and decided by Klaphake, Presiding Judge, Amundson, Judge, and Willis, Judge.
Appellant challenges the denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus, contending that various procedures of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (UCEA) were not followed. Specifically, he alleges the district court erred by denying the petition because (1) he was not brought before a judge after his arrest within the timeframe mandated by the UCEA, (2) a fugitive from justice complaint filed by the Minnesota authorities was incorrect on its face and should have been dismissed, and (3) there were flaws in the first set of extradition documents. We affirm.
F A C T S
On May 5, 2000, the prosecuting attorney for Cowlitz County, Washington filed a complaint against William Nelson Schenk III alleging solicitation to commit murder in the first degree. After a hearing that day, the Cowlitz County Superior Court issued a warrant for Schenk’s arrest. The Cowlitz County Sheriff’s Office then sent a teletype which included the arrest warrant and an “attempt to locate” request to the Morrison County, Minnesota, Sheriff’s Office. The teletype specifically noted that Schenk was wanted for solicitation to commit murder. That evening, a deputy arrested Schenk at his job in Little Falls, Minnesota and he was placed in custody.
On May 9, 2000, Schenk was charged in Morrison County as a fugitive from justice under Minn. Stat. §629.13 (2000). Schenk appeared in District Court that day and contested the complaint and warrant, claiming he had not been out of Minnesota since February 3, 2000.
The next hearing was held on May 22, 2000 and was continued at the request of Schenk’s attorney. At a June 19, 2000 hearing, Schenk’s motion to dismiss the Minnesota fugitive of justice complaint and his motion to be released were dismissed. Thereafter, Schenk filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
On June 12, 2000, the Governor of Washington issued a requisition request. In response, on July 7, 2000, Governor Ventura issued a rendition warrant to deliver Schenk to Washington. On July 21, 2000, Governor Ventura recalled the rendition warrant which had incorrectly indicated that Schenk had committed the alleged offense in Washington. He issued a new rendition warrant based on modified information received from the Governor of Washington alleging that Schenk committed the crime by telephone from outside of Washington.
After a hearing on July 27, 2000, the district court denied Schenk’s petition for writ of habeas corpus and ordered Schenk delivered to Washington.
D E C I S I O N
Aside from the fact that a valid arrest warrant was attached to the teletype sent to the Morrison County Sherriff’s Office, the UCEA provides that a Minnesota peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant,
upon reasonable information that the accused stands charged in the courts of a state with a crime punishable by death or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.
Minn. Stat. § 629.14 (2000). From the teletype, the Morrison County Sherriff’s Office had been notified that Schenk was charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year. Therefore the warrantless arrest was proper.
Schenk next claims that the prosecuting authorities failed to comply with the time requirements of the UCEA. Specifically, Schenk alleges that it was improper for him to be held for four days before being brought before a Minnesota judge.
The UCEA requires that,
[w]hen arrested[,] the accused must be taken before a judge with all practicable speed and complaint must be made against the accused under oath setting forth the ground for the arrest as in section 629.13. Thereafter the answer shall be heard as if the accused had been arrested on a warrant.
Id. The UCEA does not define “all practicable speed.” For interpretation, Schenk urges us to look to the rules of criminal procedure which require that those arrested without a warrant be brought before a judge within 36 hours. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 4.02, subd. 5. Schenk also contends that it was error for him not to be brought before a judge for a probable cause determination within 48 hours of his warrantless arrest. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 4.03, subd. 1. Neither assertion is correct.
The rules of criminal procedure cited by the appellant do not control here. Ordinarily, if the supreme court promulgates a time rule relating to pleadings, practice, procedure, and the form thereof in criminal actions, and that time rule conflicts with a time rule in a statute, the time rule in the statute shall thereafter be of no force and effect. Minn. Stat. § 480.059, subd. 7 (2000). Notwithstanding any rule, however, statutes which relate to extradition, detainers, and arrest, found in sections 629.01 to 629.404 of the UCEA remain in full force and effect. Minn. Stat. § 480.059, subd. 7(f). Thus, the time rules of the UCEA apply here.
We do not find the four-day delay unreasonable in light of the circumstances. An impartial party, a Washington superior court judge, had previously reviewed the case and found probable cause for Schenk’s arrest. After his arrest, Scheck was brought before a Minnesota district court judge within four days.
Citing Minn. Stat. § 629.13, Schenk next claims the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the complaint filed against him by the Morrison County Attorney. He alleges the complaint is defective on its face because he has proven that he was in Minnesota during the period alleged in the complaint and therefore could not have fled from Washington. But the act of having fled from justice in another state is not a necessary element of the charge in instances where, as here, the defendant has been charged with a crime in another state based on acts that were committed in Minnesota. Minn. Stat. § 629.06 (2000). The district court’s ruling, therefore, was not in error.
Schenk’s final argument is that the first rendition warrant, on its face, failed to state valid grounds for extradition because it alleged that Schenk had committed the alleged crime while in Washington and that that statement was factually incorrect. He further claims that this error invalidated the first extradition warrant and that the writ of habeas corpus therefore should have been granted. However, this issue is now moot. Where a rendition warrant is found invalid and an accused is released, that person still may be rearrested upon the reissuance of a proper rendition warrant. State ex rel. Brown v. Hedman, 280 Minn. 69, 71, 157 N.W.2d 756, 757 (1968). Before the hearing date, Governor Ventura corrected the error Schenk alleges. Thus, the second rendition warrant, issued before the hearing date, was not incorrect. Schenk may be surrendered to the Washington authorities.
 Minn. Stat. § 629.13 provides for the issuance of a warrant when an individual is “charged * * * with the commission of any crime in any other state and, except in cases arising under section 629.06 [under which Schenk was charged] with having fled from justice.”