This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1998).

 

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

C7-00-1134

 

State of Minnesota,

Respondent,

 

vs.

 

Daniel Glen Myers,

Appellant.

 

 

Filed October 31, 2000

Affirmed

Shumaker, Judge

 

Ramsey County District Court

File No. KX-99-1102

 

 

Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 525 Park Street, Suite 500, St. Paul, MN 55103; and

 

Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Darrell C. Hill, Assistant County Attorney, 50 West Kellogg Blvd., Suite 315, St. Paul, MN 55102-1657 (for respondent)

 

John M. Stuart, State Public Defender, Susan K. Maki, Assistant State Public Defender, Suite 600, 2829 University Avenue S.E., Minneapolis, MN 55414 (for appellant)

 

            Considered and decided by Anderson, Presiding Judge, Kalitowski, Judge, and Shumaker, Judge.

 

 

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N

SHUMAKER, Judge

            Appellant pleaded guilty to Obstruction of Legal Process.  The district court concluded that the offense was a crime against a person and imposed a sentence to be served consecutively to a federal sentence previously imposed upon appellant.  Appellant contends that the district court erred in imposing a consecutive sentence.  We affirm.

FACTS

            A state trooper arrested appellant Daniel Glen Myers for driving while under the influence of alcohol, placed him without handcuffs in the back seat of the squad car, and began to drive to the police station. 

            During the trip, Myers asked the trooper to open the divider between the front and back seats so that they could talk.  When the trooper did so, Myers lunged into the front seat and grabbed the trooper’s gun with both hands.  Fearing for his life, the trooper struggled to retain the gun and to avoid colliding with other traffic on the highway.  The trooper’s face was cut in the altercation.   The trooper eventually obtained backup help and subdued Myers.

            Myers pleaded guilty to Obstruction of Legal Process as a felony, and to other charges.  The district court determined that Myer’s act constituted a crime against a person and imposed a sentence to run consecutively to an unexpired federal sentence.

 

 

D E C I S I O N

            We employ an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing a district court’s sentencing decisions.  Rairdon v. State, 557 N.W.2d 318, 326 (Minn. 1996).

            A district court may sentence a current felony conviction for a crime against a person consecutively to a prior unexpired felony sentence for a crime against a person without the sentence constituting a departure from the guidelines.  Minn. Sent. Guidelines II.F.  See also State v. Munger, 597 N.W.2d 570, 573 (Minn. App. 1999), review denied (Minn. Aug. 25, 1999).  Myers concedes that his unexpired federal sentence was for a crime against a person.  But, he contends that the state charge of Obstruction of Legal Process is a crime against the administration of justice and not a crime against a person.  He notes that the sentencing guidelines do not define “crime against a person,” and Obstruction of Legal Process is not included as a "crime of violence" under Minn. Stat. § 624.712, subd. 5 (1998).  Therefore, he argues, the district court erred in concluding that his conduct constituted a crime against a person.

            In determining whether an offense is a crime against a person, we do not limit ourselves to considering only the label of the offense or its general nature; rather, we ascertain whether the underlying conduct “carr[ied] with it the possibility of violence and therefore some special risks to human life.”  State v. Henderson, 394 N.W.2d 561, 563-64 (Minn. App. 1986) (quoting State v. Nunn, 297 N.W.2d 752, 754 (Minn. 1980)), review denied (Minn. Dec. 17, 1986).

            Here, Myers’ effort to take the trooper’s weapon carried with it the possibility of violence and a risk to the trooper’s life.  Moreover, Myers’ struggle in a moving vehicle also created the possibility of a collision and a risk to the trooper’s life.  Under these facts, the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Obstruction of Legal Process was a crime against a person for which a consecutive sentence could be imposed.

            In his pro se supplemental brief, Myers argues that the trooper failed to follow required procedures by not handcuffing him, and that the trooper cut himself when he was reaching out to call for a backup.  Myers advances the novel claim that he should be exonerated because the trooper allegedly failed to protect him from the consequences of his own illegal and dangerous conduct.  He fails to support his claim with legal argument or authority.  Therefore, we reject it.  See State v. Butcher, 563 N.W.2d 776, 780 (Minn. App. 1997) (holding that issues not briefed and argued on appeal will not be considered), review denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 1997).

            Affirmed.