This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1998).







Steven K. Thompson, petitioner,





Patricia R. Thompson,




Filed August 1, 2000


Halbrooks, Judge


Hennepin County District Court

File No. 187442



Steven K. Thompson, 16120 37th Avenue North, Plymouth, MN 55447 (pro se respondent)


Patricia R. Thompson, 210 George Street, Excelsior, MN 55331 (pro se appellant)




            Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge, Davies, Judge, and Halbrooks, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N


            Appellant challenges a district court order terminating respondent’s child-support obligation due to the fact that the child in question was over the age of 18 and no longer attending a secondary school.  We affirm.


            Appellant Patricia R. Thompson and respondent Steven K. Thompson were married on July 31, 1976, and separated in August 1993.  The parties have three children:  Brandon, age 22; Chad, age 20; and Angela, age 18.  The marriage was dissolved in a judgment and decree entered on April 7, 1995.  Physical custody of Brandon was awarded to appellant.  Physical custody of Chad and Angela was initially awarded to respondent. 

            In an amended decree dated October 24, 1996, respondent was ordered to pay child support for Brandon Thompson until such time as he reached the age of 18 (or age 20 if still attending secondary school), was emancipated, or until further order of the court.  Appellant was ordered to pay child support for Chad and Angela in the same manner. 

            By order dated July 2, 1998, the district court awarded physical custody of Chad and Angela to appellant and ordered respondent to pay child support to appellant.  Appellant was concomitantly relieved of her obligation to pay child support to respondent.

            At a July 26, 1999 hearing, respondent brought a motion to establish that Angela, the parties’ then-remaining minor child, is emancipated and for relief of his obligation to pay child support on her behalf.  Brandon and Chad were already emancipated at that time.  In an order dated July 27, 1999, the district court denied respondent’s motion for emancipation and ordered respondent to continue paying child support for Angela as long as she remained enrolled in school. 

            Respondent brought a second motion seeking the identical relief, which was heard on September 23, 1999.  At the hearing, respondent alleged that Angela was no longer enrolled in school, as she had an “inactive” status at Minnetonka High School.  In response, appellant provided the court with a letter from Lola Vedders, a Program Facilitator/Teacher at the Ridgedale Alternative Program, confirming that Angela was enrolled there as a full-time student.  The court allowed respondent until December 10, 1999, to provide the court with evidence to the contrary; appellant was given ten days to respond to any additional evidence provided.  A series of conflicting letters from Ms. Vedders was subsequently provided to the court:

1.         A September 30, 1999 letter stating that Angela was not enrolled at Ridgedale;


2.         An October 20, 1999 letter stating that Angela was enrolled at Ridgedale as a full-time student;


3.         A December 3, 1999 letter stating that Angela had been placed on inactive status for failure to meet attendance requirements. 


Appellant did not submit any additional evidence to counter the December 3, 1999 letter from Ms. Vedders.  Therefore, in an order dated January 20, 2000, the district court ordered that respondent’s child-support obligation for Angela be terminated.  This appeal follows. 


            “The district court enjoys broad discretion in ordering modifications to child support orders.”  Gully v. Gully, 599 N.W.2d 814, 820 (Minn. 1999) (citation omitted).  An appellate court should reverse a district court’s order regarding child support only if convinced that the court abused its broad discretion by making “a clearly erroneous conclusion that is against the logic and the facts on [the] record.”  Id. (quoting Rutten v. Rutten, 347 N.W.2d 47, 50 (Minn. 1984)). 

            In the instant case, respondent’s child-support obligation was to terminate when Angela reached age 18, or age 20, if she remained in a secondary school.  Because Angela is beyond her eighteenth birthday, the case before the district court turned on whether Angela was still attending a secondary school.  The most timely information submitted to the district court was that Angela was no longer attending a secondary school.  Termination of child support was, therefore, supported by the evidence.

            Appellant asks this court to take into consideration additional evidence, a fourth letter from Ms. Vedders dated February 11, 2000.  Because the fourth letter is not part of the trial court record, this letter cannot be considered here. 

            The papers filed in the trial court, the exhibits, and the transcript of the proceedings, if any, shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases.


Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 110.01.  This court “cannot base its decision on matters outside the record on appeal and any matters not part of the record must be stricken.”  Mitterhauser v. Mitterhauser, 399 N.W.2d 664, 667 (Minn. App. 1987) (citation omitted).  This additional evidence provided by appellant must be stricken from the record. 

            Appellant, in her brief, requests an award of court costs on appeal.  Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 139.01 prescribes the proper procedure for obtaining an award of costs on appeal: 

Unless otherwise ordered by the appellate court, the prevailing party shall recover costs as follows:

(1)  upon a judgment in his favor on the merits, statutory costs in the amount of $300, Minnesota Statutes, section 549.02, subdivision 2 (1993).

(2)  upon a dismissal, $10.  


(Emphasis added.)  Given our decision, an award of costs is not appropriate in this case. 

Appellant also requests this court to administer certain mutual funds/trust funds/UTMA accounts.  It appears that appellant is raising this issue for the first time on appeal.  The district court’s order makes no reference to such a request and appellant did not provide this court with a transcript of the September 23, 1999 hearing. 

“When an appellant fails to provide a transcript, this court’s review is limited to whether the trial court’s conclusions of law are supported by the findings.”  Mesenbourg v. Mesenbourg, 538 N.W.2d 489, 494 (Minn. App. 1995) (citing Duluth Herald & News Tribune v. Plymouth Optical Co., 286 Minn. 495, 498, 176 N.W.2d 552, 555 (1970)).  The appellant has the burden to provide an adequate record.  Id.

Based on the record presented on appeal, the matter of the mutual funds/trust funds/UTMA accounts is not properly before this court.  Appellant may pursue relief on this matter in the district court if she so chooses.