This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. ß 480A.08, subd. 3 (1998).
STATE OF MINNESOTA
IN COURT OF APPEALS
State of Minnesota,
Ricardo Bernard Marones,
Filed February 29, 2000
Ramsey County District Court
File No. K9-97-3788
Richard J. Coleman, 295 Marie Avenue East, West St. Paul, MN 55118 (for appellant)
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, 525 Park Street, Suite 500, St. Paul, MN 55103; and
Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Jeanne L. Schleh, Assistant County Attorney, Ramsey County Government Center West, 50 West Kellogg Blvd., Suite 315, St. Paul, MN 55102 (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Lansing, Presiding Judge, Davies, Judge, and Harten, Judge.
U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N
Appellant Ricardo Bernard Marones challenges a district courtís revocation of his probation. He argues that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that (1) his cocaine use was an intentional or inexcusable act and (2) the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation. Because we see no abuse of discretion, we affirm.
Appellant pleaded guilty to second-degree sale of cocaine, in violation of Minn. Stat. ß 152.022, subd. 1(1) and 3(a). The district court stayed execution of a 68-month sentence on condition that appellant (1) serve one year in the Ramsey County Correctional Facility and (2) abide by conditions of probation including abstaining from the use of all controlled substances and submitting to random drug testing. Appellant was ordered to report to the correctional facility on August 7, 1998, to begin serving his one year. He failed to do so, however, thereby triggering a probation violation report. On October 16, 1998, appellant appeared in district court for the violation hearing. The district court found his violation inexcusable but gave him another chance on probation. During his incarceration, appellant refused to attend any chemical-dependency programs offered to him. In April 1999, appellant was released from the correction facility, but remained on probation.
Thereafter, while on probation, appellant tested positive for cocaine and admitted to using cocaine. His probation officer reported that appellant tested positive for cocaine on July 19, 1999, and August 18, 1999, and that he was a difficult probationer. On September 3, 1999, at a second probation-violation hearing, appellant admitted to using cocaine. The district court revoked appellantís probation and executed his sentence. Appellant challenges the revocation.
D E C I S I O N
The district courtís decision to revoke probation will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Theel, 532 N.W.2d 265, 266-67 (Minn. App. 1995) (quoting State v. Austin, 295 N.W.2d 246, 249-50 (Minn. 1980)), review denied (Minn. July 20, 1995). Before the district court can revoke probation, it must
(1) designate the specific conditions that were violated; (2) find that the violation was inexcusable or intentional; and (3) find that the need for confinement outweighs the policies supporting probation.
Id. at 267 (citing Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 250). Appellant contends that the district court abused its discretion by revoking his probation. He advances two arguments in support of his position.
First, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that his cocaine use was an intentional or inexcusable act because he is an untreated cocaine addict. A probationerís drug addiction, however, does not vitiate intent. See State v. Ehmke, 400 N.W.2d 839, 840-41 (Minn. App. 1987) (affirming a revocation order that was based in part on probationerís inability to control his addiction to alcohol). We find no abuse of discretion.
Second, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that the need for confinement outweighed the policies favoring probation. Probation should not be revoked unless:
(i) confinement is necessary to protect the public from further criminal activity by the offender; or
(ii) the offender is in need of correctional treatment which can most effectively be provided if he is confined; or
(iii) it would unduly depreciate the seriousness of the violation if probation were not revoked.
Austin, 295 N.W.2d at 251 (citation omitted). Appellant claims that the state should first attempt to treat his addiction. But the record shows that appellant failed to take advantage of his opportunity to obtain drug treatment. The purpose of probation is rehabilitation, and when rehabilitation has clearly failed, a court may justifiably revoke probation. See id. at 250. Moreover, it would substantially depreciate the seriousness of appellantís violation if the district court failed to take aggressive action in response to it.
We find sufficient evidence in the record to support the district courtís conclusion that appellant intentionally violated conditions of his probation and that the need for his confinement outweighs the policies favoring continuing his probation. Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion.