This opinion will be unpublished and
may not be cited except as provided by
Minn. Stat. ß 480A.08, subd. 3 (1998).


State of Minnesota,


Fritz Rappe,

Filed January 4, 2000
Crippen, Judge

Hennepin County District Court
File No. 98065607

Mike Hatch, Minnesota Attorney General, Suite 500, 525 Park Street, St. Paul, MN 55103; and

David K. Ross, Carson, Clelland & Schroeder, Suite 305, 6300 Shingle Creek Parkway, Minneapolis, MN 55430 (for respondent)

Charles A. Ramsay, Ramsay Law Firm, Ltd., Suite 111, 2151 Hamline Avenue North, Roseville, MN 55113 (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Crippen, Presiding Judge, Schumacher, Judge, and Davies, Judge.

U N P U B L I S H E D   O P I N I O N


Upon learning that revocation of his driverís license was rescinded in implied consent proceedings, appellant moved to withdraw his earlier plea of guilty to a criminal charge of driving under the influence of alcohol. Appellant asserted ineffectiveness of counsel in the DUI proceedings, claiming that counsel did not inform him that his plea would result in revocation of his driverís licenseóor, more narrowly, that his criminal conviction would prevent the reinstatement of his driverís license in the event he obtained a favorable result in the implied consent proceedings. We affirm the trial courtís denial of appellantís motion.


Appellant pleaded guilty to DUI in September 1998. At the time, he was represented by counsel and was awaiting a ruling in his implied consent hearing. In October 1998, the judge in the implied consent hearing rescinded revocation of appellantís driving privileges, but appellantís driverís license could not be reinstated because of his DUI conviction. The trial court denied appellantís motion to withdraw his guilty plea.


After sentencing, a criminal defendant may withdraw a guilty plea if he shows that this is necessary to correct a "manifest injustice." Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573, 577 (Minn. 1998) (citation omitted). When a guilty plea is not accurate, voluntary and intelligent, a manifest injustice occurs. Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 577. In order for a guilty plea to be intelligent, the defendant must be aware of the direct consequences of the guilty plea. Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 578. The ultimate decision on the withdrawal of a guilty plea "is left to the sound discretion of the trial court," and this court reverses only upon an abuse of discretion. Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989).

Ignorance of a collateral consequence does not entitle a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea, Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 578, and revocation of driving privileges is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea. State v. Washburn, 602 N.W.2d 244, 246 (Minn. App. 1999). See also Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 578 (holding deportation collateral consequence of guilty plea); Moore v. Hinton, 513 F.2d 781, 782-83 (5th Cir. 1975) (suspension of driverís license collateral consequence of pleading guilty to driving while intoxicated).

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in finding his motion flawed because "he did not assert his innocence" to the charge. We first observe that the trial courtís reasoning is germane to appellantís contention that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Such a claim could succeed only on a showing that the error of counsel altered the result of the proceedings. See Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 577. Moreover, the trial court did not confine its rationale to this observation but also found appellant was fully advised of the consequences of his plea. Because appellant was represented by an attorney, a presumption applies that appellant was fully advised of his rights and the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty. See State v. Clark, 279 N.W.2d 836, 837 (Minn. 1979). The record permitted the trial court to find this presumption was not overcome.