IN COURT OF APPEALS
Filed November 29, 2005
Affirmed in part and reversed in part
Hennepin County District Court
File No. MC 03 002226
Gary A. Van Cleve, Jessica B. Rivas, Larkin Hoffman Daly & Lindgren, Ltd., 1500 Wells Fargo Plaza, 7900 Xerxes Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55431 (for respondent)
George C. Hoff, Justin L. Templin, Hoff, Barry & Kuderer, P.A., 160 Flagship Corporate Center, 775 Prairie Center Drive, Eden Prairie, MN 55344-7319 (for appellant)
Susan L. Naughton, League of
Considered and decided by Peterson, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Wright, Judge.
S Y L L A B U S
1. Minn. Stat. § 15.99 (2004) is a timing statute that does not alter substantive law.
2. If a local government unit fails to act on an application for a wetland exemption within 60 days, under Minn. Stat. § 15.99 the application is approved only to the extent permitted by statute.
O P I N I O N
Appellant challenges the district court’s decision to grant respondent’s petition for a writ of mandamus. Appellant contends that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider respondent’s petition because respondent did not appeal to the Board of Water and Soil Resources (BWSR) before petitioning the district court for a writ of mandamus. But because appellant failed to make a decision on respondent’s exemption application within 60 days, as required by Minn. Stat. § 15.99 (2004), appellant lost the ability to act on that application. Therefore, respondent was not required to appeal to the BWSR, and the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction. Appellant also argues that the district court erred in finding that it has the authority to grant respondent a wetland exemption in the amount of 5,737 square feet. Under the applicable statutes, we conclude that appellant’s authority to grant respondent an exemption was limited to a maximum of 400 square feet. We affirm the district court on the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, but reverse the district court’s decision with respect to the application of Minn. Stat. § 15.99.
the summer of 2000, respondent Richard Breza filled 5,737 square feet of
wetland on his property in Minnetrista.
It is undisputed that pursuant to Minn. Stat. §§ 103G.221–.2242
(2004), a permit was required to fill this wetland and that Breza did not
obtain one before he acted. In the fall
of 2000, a DNR officer observed the fill on Breza’s land; the officer informed
Breza that he would receive a cease-and-desist order in the mail and that in
order to avoid having to remove the entire amount of fill, Breza needed to file
for an exemption. In December 2000, Breza
received the cease-and-desist order, which contained a wetland-exemption application. He then completed the application and sent it
to appellant City of
Breza did not receive any response from the city regarding his application until January 2002, at which time the city advised him that his application could not be accepted because the Wetland Conservation Act measures impact to wetlands by area of fill, not volume, as Breza had described it. In June 2002, Breza’s attorney wrote to the city, stating that, because it failed to deny Breza’s application within 60 days, the application was approved by operation of law under Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2 (2004). The city responded in July 2002, conceding that it had failed to respond to Breza’s application within 60 days and informing Breza that the only exemption legally permissible was a de minimis exemption of 400 square feet under Minn. R. 8420.0122, subp. 9(A)(5) (2005). The city further advised Breza that the decision would be final unless appealed to the BWSR within 15 days of the date of mailing of the notice.
Breza contends that the entire area filled—5,737 square feet—should have been approved as a consequence of the city’s failure to deny his application within 60 days. Breza sought review of his application at a city-council meeting in February 2003. The city council affirmed the decision to grant Breza a maximum exemption of 400 square feet. Breza then petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus to compel the city to approve Breza’s exemption application for 5,737 square feet.
The district court denied the parties’ motions for summary judgment and held a bench trial on the merits of Breza’s petition. The district court granted the writ because it found that Breza’s exemption application was for the full 5,737 square feet and that, as a result of the city’s failure to act within the statutorily provided time frame of 60 days, the full extent of Breza’s application was approved by operation of law. This appeal follows.
1. Did the district court have subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Breza’s challenge to the city’s wetland-exemption decision?
2. Did the district court err in granting a writ of mandamus compelling the city to grant Breza a wetland exemption for 5,737 square feet?
Whether a district court has “subject-matter
jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review de novo.” In re
Thulin, 660 N.W.2d 140, 143 (
notwithstanding any other law to the contrary, an agency must approve or deny within 60 days a written request relating to zoning, septic systems, or expansion of the metropolitan urban service area for a permit, license, or other governmental approval of an action. Failure of an agency to deny a request within 60 days is approval of the request.
Application of Minn. Stat. § 15.99 (2004) under these circumstances is a case of first impression.
It is undisputed that Breza applied to the city on December
29, 2000, for a wetland exemption and that the city did not act within the
requisite 60 days. Thus, as of February
28, 2001, Breza’s application was approved by operation of law. See
The city argues that, due to Breza’s failure to appeal its July 2002 decision to the BWSR within 30 days, that exemption determination was final. We disagree, because Breza’s application was approved by operation of law as of February 28, 2001. Once an application is approved by operation of law under Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2, the local government unit (LGU) loses jurisdiction over the application, and any attempt thereafter to act on the application is invalid. As a result, the city did not make a decision that Breza could appeal to the BWSR. Neither of the January 2002 or July 2002 letters that the city sent to Breza constituted appealable decisions made by the city because they were well beyond the 60-day time limit. Thus, the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Breza’s petition for a writ of mandamus.
To determine whether the district court erred in granting Breza’s petition for a writ of mandamus, we must analyze whether the city had the authority to grant Breza an exemption for 5,737 square feet, whether mandamus was appropriate under these circumstances, and if the district court erred in finding that Breza applied for an exemption in the amount of 5,737 square feet. If the city lacked the authority to grant an exemption for 5,737 square feet, we need not reach the related issue of the amount of exemption Breza applied for.
A. The scope of the city’s authority
chapter 8420 (2005) governs wetland conservation, including fill
exemptions. A provision of that rule
states that, “[t]he local government unit decision shall be based on the exemption standards in part 8420.0122.”
that Moreno v. City of Minneapolis,
676 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. App. 2004), supports his position that he is entitled to an
exemption for 5,737 square feet. In
But those are
not the facts before us. Because the
city did not have the authority to grant Breza’s application for a 5,737
square-foot exemption if it had acted during the 60 days, its inaction cannot
serve to approve it. Thus,
Breza cites Gun Lake Assoc. v. County of Aitkin, 612
N.W.2d 177 (Minn. App. 2000), for the proposition that, when an application has
been approved by operation of law, regardless of what the application was for,
approval cannot be considered an error of law.
We disagree. In Gun Lake, a residents’ association
opposed a planning commission’s “approval” of a conditional-use permit (CUP)
(the planning commission did not actually approve the CUP; it missed the 60-day
deadline) and appealed the “approval” to the county board. 612 N.W.2d at 179-80. The allegations made by the
residents’ association were that the county board’s decision denying its appeal
“was arbitrary, oppressive, unreasonable, fraudulent, under an erroneous theory
of law or without evidentiary support.”
stated, statutory construction is a question of law, which this court reviews
that the language “notwithstanding any other law to the contrary” contained in
the first sentence of Minn. Stat. § 15.99, subd. 2, qualifies the second
sentence of that section. Thus, under Breza’s
reasoning, any application, for literally any action made by an individual to
an LGU, regardless of whether the LGU has the authority to grant such
application, is deemed automatically approved by operation of law if the LGU fails
to act within 60 days. But this
interpretation of the statute leads to an absurd and unreasonable result. See
To conclude as
Breza urges that the legislature intended Minn. Stat. § 15.99 to supersede
every statute that grants specific, limited authority to an agency would give
agencies the ability to indirectly approve applications that they do not have
direct authority to approve by simply failing to make a decision within 60
days. We conclude that Minn. Stat. §
15.99 is a timing statute. See Manco of Fairmont, Inc. v. Town Bd. of
Rock Dell Twp., 583 N.W.2d 293, 296 (
Thus, if an LGU does not have the underlying authority to approve an application within the 60 days, the application cannot be approved by the LGU’s inaction. Here, the city only had the authority to grant Breza an exemption of 400 square feet. Therefore, as a result of the city’s inaction and violation of the timing statute, that is the only exemption that was approved by operation of law.
We will reverse
a district court’s order on a petition for mandamus relief “only when there is
no evidence reasonably tending to sustain the trial court’s findings.” Coyle
v. City of
Breza relies on Kramer for the proposition that, under these circumstances, a writ of mandamus from the district court is appropriate. Breza is correct that seeking a writ of mandamus for a Minn. Stat. § 15.99 violation is a possible remedy. But his reliance on Kramer under these circumstances is misplaced because Kramer is distinguishable.
Kramer applied for a plat from the county planning commission,
and the commission failed to approve or deny the plat application within the
requisite 60 days.
Kramer filed a petition for a writ
of mandamus in the district court to compel the commission to approve his plat
application as Minn. Stat. § 15.99 required the commission to do.
county’s persistent refusal to grant Kramer’s application after the 60 days had
elapsed was a “failure of an official to perform a duty clearly imposed by law,”
a writ of mandamus compelling it to approve the application was appropriate.
Because the city does not have the authority to grant Breza an exemption for more than 400 square feet, the city has fully satisfied its official duties. Therefore, under these circumstances, mandamus is not appropriate, and the district court erred by granting Breza’s petition.
Because the city lacked the authority to grant Breza an exemption larger than 400 square feet, we need not reach the issue of the extent of Breza’s exemption application or whether the district court erred by finding that he applied for an exemption of 5,737 square feet.
D E C I S I O N
Because the city failed to approve or deny Breza’s exemption application within 60 days, it was approved by operation of law under Minn. Stat. § 15.99 (2004), and the city lost the ability to act on the application. Therefore, the city did not make a decision that Breza could appeal to the BWSR, and the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Breza’s petition for a writ of mandamus. But because the city did not possess the authority to approve Breza’s exemption application in an amount greater than 400 square feet, the district court erred in granting Breza’s petition for a 5,737 square foot exemption.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
 In his brief, Breza raises as an issue the propriety and independence of the amicus brief that was written by an attorney for the League of Minnesota Cities because the League also provided an attorney for the city in the district court. The amicus application was properly made under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 129.01, and Breza did not make a proper motion to strike the amicus brief under Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 127. Moreover, it is this court’s practice to freely grant amicus applications to ensure the development of a more complete appellate record.
 The Legislature has not altered the substance of the statutes or the administrative rules since 2000-01, the time frame in which Breza filled the wetland and applied for this exemption.
 For discussion and analysis of this statute, see, infra section II.A.
“Appeal of a[n] . . . exemption . . . may be obtained by mailing a petition . .
. to the board within 30 days after the postmarked date of the mailing [of the
summary of approval or denial.] If
appeal is not sought within 30 days, the decision becomes final.”
[t]he decision of a local government unit to approve, approve with conditions, or reject a[n] . . . exemption . . . becomes final if not appealed to the board within 30 days after the date on which the decision is mailed . . . . This subpart applies to those determinations which are made under comprehensive wetland protection and management plans.
 It should be noted, however, that this exemption amount is the maximum amount that Breza is entitled to without filing an after-the-fact wetland permit application to the city, proposing an alternative mitigation plan for the remaining impacts. If the application were approved, Breza would be able to keep more than 400 square feet of fill.