IN COURT OF APPEALS
Unity Church of St. Paul, et
Adath Jeshurun Congregation, et al.,
City of Minneapolis,
People Serving People, Inc., et al.,
State of Minnesota,
Ramsey County District Court
File No. C9-03-9570
Mike Hatch, Attorney General,
Lori Swanson, Solicitor General, Thomas R. Ragatz, Ann K. Bloodhart, Assistants
Attorneys General, 1800
Marshall H. Tanick, Mansfield, Tanick & Cohen, P.A., 1700 Pillsbury Center South, 220 South Sixth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402-4511 (for respondents Unity Church of St. Paul, et al.)
David Lillehaug, Fredrikson & Byron, P.A., 4000 Pillsbury Center, 200 South Sixth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402-1425 (for respondents Adath Jeshurun Congregation, et al.)
Peter Ginder, Acting Deputy
Minneapolis City Attorney, Burt T. Osborne, Assistant City Attorney,
John B. Gordon, Elizabeth H. Schmiesing, Faegre & Benson LLP, 2200 Wells Fargo Center, 90 South Seventh Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402; and
James P. McCarthy, Lindquist & Vennum PLLP, 4200 IDS Center, 80 South Eighth Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402 (for respondents People Serving People, et al.)
Joseph E. Olson, David M. Gross, 8323 West Franklin Avenue, St. Louis Park, MN 55426-1914 (for amicus curiae Gun Owners Civil Rights Alliance)
William Z. Pentelovich, Dawn C. VanTassel, Maslon, Edelman, Borman & Brand, LLP, 3300 Wells Fargo Center, 90 South Seventh Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402-4140; and
Teresa J. Nelson, American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota, 450 North Syndicate, Suite 230, St. Paul, MN 55104 (for amicus curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Minnesota)
Considered and decided by Randall, Presiding Judge; Halbrooks, Judge; and Minge, Judge.
I. 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28, containing the Minnesota Citizens’ Personal Protection Act of 2003, an amendment relating to firearm possession for certain criminal offenders, and various natural resources amendments, violates the single-subject requirement of Minn. Const. Art. IV, § 17. Its three disparate provisions are not germane to a single subject.
II. Severance of the Minnesota Citizens’ Personal Protection Act of 2003 from chapter 28 is the appropriate remedy where the act is the portion of chapter 28 being challenged and the act is not germane to the law’s remaining provisions.
This lawsuit involves respondent religious and charitable organizations’ constitutional challenge to the Minnesota Citizens’ Personal Protection Act of 2003 (PPA). The district court granted partial summary judgment in favor of respondents, holding that 2003 Minn. Laws. ch. 28 violated the single-subject requirement of Minn. Const. Art. IV, § 17. The district court remedied the violation by severing the PPA from the rest of chapter 28.
Appellant argues that (1) 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28 does not violate the single-subject requirement of Minn. Const. Art. IV, § 17 and (2) the PPA does not violate the Freedom of Conscience clause of the Minnesota Constitution as applied to respondents.
We conclude the district court properly found that chapter 28 violates the single-subject requirement of the Minnesota Constitution. Then, the district court properly severed the disparate portion of the bill (the PPA) from the remainder of chapter 28. Since we affirm the district court on the single-subject issue, we decline to address appellant’s Freedom of Conscience clause argument on an advisory basis.
history of the PPA is an integral part of the parties’ legal arguments. On January 30, 2003, Representative Lynda
Boudreau introduced the PPA as H.F. 261.
261 passed through the House Civil Law Committee, the House Committee on
Judiciary Policy and Finance, and the House Committee on Ways and Means, with
the recommendation that it pass as amended.
S.F. 842 was introduced in the Senate on March 13, 2003 as a “bill for an act
relating to natural resources.” State of
April 23, 2003, the same day the PPA was to be considered, S.F. 842 was brought
to the House floor. State of
Boudreau then moved to amend S.F. 842 to include H.F. 261, the PPA, and to
divide the PPA and DNR bill into 2 separate articles. House Floor Debate on S.F. No. 842 (Apr. 23,
2003). Before voting on this motion,
Representative Lynn Osterman moved to amend H.F. 261 to include “Article 3,” a
lifetime ban on firearm possession for violent felons. State of
House passed Osterman’s amendment by a vote of 112 to 18.
in the Senate, Senator Olson moved that the Senate concur in the House
amendments and re-pass S.F. 842.
Soon thereafter, respondents Unity
Church of St. Paul d/b/a Unity Church Unitarian and White Bear Unitarian
Universalist Church filed a complaint in Ramsey County District Court
challenging the constitutionality of provisions of the PPA, arguing that the
act violates the Freedom of Conscience clause of the Minnesota Constitution,
Minn. Const. Art. I, § 16. Over the next several months, three groups of
intervenors joined the lawsuit, known during the litigation as “Religious
Organizations,” the City of
Respondents filed motions for partial summary judgment on several different grounds, some raising Freedom of Conscience clause challenges, and others making “takings” (improper use of eminent domain–no compensation) arguments. But all respondents singularly argued that 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28 violated the single-subject requirement of Minn. Const. Art. IV, § 17.
The district court did not rule on respondents’ other arguments, namely whether the PPA violates the Freedom of Conscience clause of the Minnesota Constitution, and whether the PPA constitutes a property taking without compensation in violation of the state and federal constitutions. The district court “[made] comment regarding both issues to provide guidance to the Appellate Courts.” This appeal followed.
I. Does 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28 violate the single-subject requirement of Minn. Const. Art. IV, § 17?
II. Does the Minnesota Citizens’ Personal Protection Act of 2003 violate the Freedom of Conscience clause of Minn. Const. Art. I, § 16?
appeal from summary judgment, we must determine whether there are any genuine
issues of material fact and whether the district court erred in its application
of the law. Boutin v. LaFleur, 591 N.W.2d 711, 714 (
constitutionality of a statute presents such a question of law, which we review
de novo. State v. Behl, 564 N.W.2d 560, 566 (
Appellant challenges the district court’s determination that 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28 violates the single-subject requirement of the Minnesota Constitution.
First, and importantly to the parties, in reviewing the district court’s findings, we are not reviewing the merits of the PPA. We are simply reviewing the district court’s determination that the subject matter of the various provisions contained in 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28 was not germane to a single subject. This case does not address the merits of the PPA and constitutes no comment on the public policy underlying the act itself (other than to reiterate that the public policy of “single-subject germaneness” has been embedded in the Minnesota Constitution since passage in 1857.)
ensure that all readers of this opinion, legal and lay persons, have a common
language, we have a commentary. The PPA
has been widely known, debated, and discussed, under a nickname—the “conceal
and carry” bill. Somehow, the nickname
“conceal and carry” got on the bill and stuck like a porcupine’s quills in the
nose of an overaggressive hunting dog.
To set the record straight, both sides agree there is not now, nor has
there ever been, any “conceal” in the laws surrounding the regulation and
application for a permit to carry a handgun on one’s person. “Conceal” has never been a part of the
PPA. The PPA allows you, if you have the
permit, to carry the handgun openly or to have it beneath some article of
clothing where it does not show. If you
do not get the permit, it does not matter whether you wish to carry the handgun
outside or inside your clothing. You
cannot do it without being criminally liable.
discussing the district court’s ruling, both sides agree the starting point is
the constitutional provision. Article 4,
section 17, requires that “[n]o law shall embrace more than one subject, which
shall be expressed in its title.”
purpose of the single-subject requirement is to prevent “log rolling
legislation” or “omnibus bills” in which dissimilarsubjects are united in one bill and carried through by a combination of
interests. Associated Builders, 610
N.W.2d at 299 (quoting Johnson v.
the single-subject provision is mandatory, “the single subject provision should
be interpreted liberally and the restriction [will] be met if the bill [is]
germane to one general subject . . . ‘it is to be given a liberal, and not a
strict, construction.’” Associated
Builders, 610 N.W.2d at 299 (quoting Johnson, 47
the oral argument on this case, appellant referred, at times, to not wanting
“liberal” or “activist” judges to overstep the will of the
What appellant is arguing for is a broad, liberal, and expansive interpretation of Article IV, Section 17, which the judiciary has traditionally applied to the all-encompassing bills of the legislature. If the judiciary were to take a strict, narrow, conservative approach to the constitutional mandate that “no law shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title,” virtually every appropriations bill, every omnibus bill, every technical cleanup bill, and every other type of multi-act legislation that the legislature routinely deals out, without even thinking about it, would be subject to Article IV scrutiny, and many would fail. The last thing appellant wants here is a strict, narrow, conservative approach to the meaning of some pretty plain English—no law shall embrace more than one subject.
we follow the traditional broad, liberal, and expansive interpretive rule set
out in Associated Builders. The
these overarching considerations in mind, a reviewing court applies a
germaneness analysis to determine whether a law violates the single-subject
requirement of article 4, section 17. Associated Builders, 610 N.W.2d at
302-03; Blanch v. Suburban Hennepin Reg’l
Park Dist., 449 N.W.2d 150, 154 (
be germane to a single subject, the various sections of the bill need only be
connected by a “mere filament” to one another and to the general subject.  See
Blanch, 449 N.W.2d at 154-55 (holding park bill was “germane” to the broad
appropriations for state government operation even though the common thread running through the sections was a “mere filament”). In other words, the connection between several matters to render them germane to one subject and to each other, “can be of various kinds, as, for example, of means to ends . . . or that all are designed for the same purpose, or that both are designated by the same term.” Johnson, 47
noted, because of the liberal deference given to the legislature,
having set out the historic liberal interpretation of Article IV, Section 17,
we note that the Minnesota Supreme Court recently sounded an alarm to the
In the case of the PPA, the district court found ascertaining a single subject in chapter 28 to be an impossible task. The district court explained,
It is clear that [the Personal Protection Act], which regulates firearms, contains a totally different subject matter from the regulatory provision and from the Department of Natural Resources found in Minnesota Statute 84.01, et. al. This law is unconstitutional because it clearly violates not only the intent, but also the clear meaning of Article 4, Section 17 of the Minnesota Constitution.
As the district court noted, article 2 of chapter 28, the PPA, plainly relates to handgun permitting, regulating who may obtain a permit and how those permits must be issued. Other portions of article 2 create new firearm crimes, modify existing crimes, and recognize the right of law-abiding citizens to self-protection through the lawful use of self-defense. The PPA also sets limits on the ability of private establishments to ban guns from their premises. Chapter 28, article 3, enacts a permanent ban on firearm possession for violent felons. Articles 2 and 3, taken together, are germane to one general subject—namely handgun permitting and firearm regulation. On the other hand, the provisions in article 1 of chapter 28 do not relate to handgun permitting and firearm regulation. Article 1 contains an array of “boilerplate” DNR-related amendments addressing (1) legislative approval of state park fees; (2) the commissioner’s authority to enter into grant agreements; (3) the commissioner’s authority to accepts gifts on behalf of the state; (4) snowmobile registration; (5) interstate reciprocity agreements for off-highway motorcycle, ATV, and watercraft safety courses; (6) littering on a highway; (7) watercraft licensing applications; (8) fines for violating game and fish laws; (9) fish house identification; (10) fish house license display; (11) hunting licensing; and (12) the state parks’ working capital fund. Article 1 contains varied provisions, and giving these provisions a common-sense interpretation, the DNR amendments (article 1) all relate to the single subject of “natural resources” or “the environment.” See Defenders of Wildlife, 632 N.W.2d at 713; Masters, 604 N.W.2d at 138. It was apparent to the district court that the subjects “natural resources” and “the environment” were not germane to mandatory handgun permitting.
chapter 28 in its entirety, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that the
two disparate subjects contained within lack a legitimate connection to one
another. Thus, chapter 28 fails the
germaneness analysis. See Johnson, 47
The legislative history of S.F. 842 sheds light on the discrepancy between article 1 (the DNR technical amendment bill) and articles 2 and 3 (handgun permitting and firearm regulation) and supports the district court’s conclusion that chapter 28 lacks one cohesive, single subject. See Defenders of Wildlife, 632 N.W.2d at 714 (acknowledging that legislative history may provide evidentiary support of single-subject violations). Article 1—the original S.F. 842—was titled in part, “an act relating to natural resources” and was known to legislators as “a DNR technical bill.” Only when the House amended S.F. 842 to include the PPA and provisions restricting a felon’s ability to possess firearms, did the bill expand to encompass topics well outside of “natural resources” and “the environment,” namely, handgun permitting
But, appellant contends that because the PPA, in terms of size and exposure, is distinguishable from the provision at issue in Associated Builders—the recent case in which the supreme court found a violation of the single-subject requirement—chapter 28 should be upheld. Appellant further notes that the PPA, unlike the offending provision in Associated Builders, is not a tiny section of an immense omnibus bill that passed through the legislature unnoticed. Appellant contends out that the PPA, as amended to S.F. 842, received extensive legislative attention in both the House and the Senate.
Appellant is correct that the House engaged in extensive debate before passing S.F. 842. The Senate discussed the act for over seven hours before re-passing the bill. That is all true, but the legislative exposure disparity between the PPA and the provision at issue in Associated Builders is a distinction without a difference. Yes, the Minnesota Supreme Court has expressed frustration with “midnight-passed garbage” or omnibus bills because these types of bills often run afoul of the single-subject requirement. But that cannot mean that bills that receive more legislative attention and more column inches in the newspaper will never violate the single-subject requirement. The proper inquiry on a constitutional challenge under Minn. Const., art. IV, § 17 is whether the law is germane to a single subject, not whether a bill was hotly debated or whether it passed through legislative committees unnoticed.
B. Logrolling and other Practical Considerations
Appellant also gives considerable weight in its brief to its claim that there was no impermissible logrolling in the passage of S.F. 842. Appellant argues that the mischief the single-subject requirement is intended to address is not present. Appellant urges this court to consider this and related “practical considerations,” to conclude that 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28 does not violate the single-subject requirement. We are not persuaded.
Associated Builders court addressed
appellant’s precise argument and determined that the contention was
misdirected. 610 N.W.2d at 303
(addressing whether the absence of impermissible logrolling preserved the law
from constitutional attack). Associated Builders clarified that “[t]he
purpose of preventing logrolling is to preclude unrelated subjects from appearing in a popular bill, not to
eliminate unpopular provisions in a bill that genuinely encompasses one general
What the Minnesota Constitution requires is germaneness. It does not require the absence of legislative maneuvering to enact unpopular, but germane, bills. In fact, the legislature has a long tradition of such permissible maneuvering since statehood. It is essential, to get any bills passed in a state that has disparate concerns in different regions of the state, and disparate concerns even within one region, that popular and less popular bills (germane) get lumped together to attract the needed votes. The judiciary understands and appreciates that.
also makes much of the extensive media attention shed on the PPA, citing Defenders of Wildlife, 632 N.W.2d at
714, and Lifteau v. Metro. Sports
Facilities Comm’n, 270 N.W.2d 749, 753 (
After closely examining the record, we hold the district court properly concluded that 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28 violates the single-subject requirement of Minn. Const. Art. IV, § 17 and is unconstitutional. Our affirmance of the district court neither prejudges the merits of the PPA nor the public policy behind the debate on the merits. Our holding does not prevent the Minnesota Legislature from attempting to pass future “carry bills.”
This case is about performing the judiciary’s
constitutional role of upholding the Minnesota Constitution and giving effect
to each of its provisions. To date, the
148 years of
Having affirmed the district court’s conclusion that 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28 violates the single-subject requirement, we next consider the district court’s remedy. The district court severed the PPA from chapter 28, and let article 1, the DNR bill, stand. Both parties propose severing the “offending” portions of chapter 28, but disagree on which parts to sever. Appellant argues that the district court improperly severed the PPA from chapter 28 and requests that this court instead sever the DNR amendments contained in article 1, leaving articles 2 and 3 standing as the law. Respondents maintain that the district court correctly severed the PPA because it was, without dispute, the “offending amendment.” We agree with respondents. Appellant does not (and cannot) disagree that the handgun carry portion of the bill, and the handgun carry portion only, is the center of this debate. Appellant does not dispute that the DNR technical amendments contained in article 1 are not offensive and are not the subject of this “single-subject” lawsuit.
In remedying constitutional deficiencies, the
judiciary should be hesitant to declare more of a law unconstitutional than
absolutely necessary to avoid “overstepping our judicial bounds in disregard of
the constitutional principle of separation of powers.” Associated
Builders, 610 N.W.2d at 305 (citing Koehnen
v. Dufuor, 590 N.W.2d 107, 113 (
while a part of [a] statute is unconstitutional, that fact does not authorize the courts to declare the remainder void also, unless all the provisions are connected in subject-matter, depending on each other, operating together for the same purpose, or otherwise so connected together in meaning.
In the single-subject context, the supreme court has
expressly advised the judiciary, if possible, to “[bring] the law into
constitutional compliance by severing a provision that is not germane to the
theme of the law.” Associated Builders, 610 N.W.2d at 305. And where litigation challenges only one
aspect of a law, the judiciary should sever the provision being challenged and
decline to prejudge unchallenged portions of the law.
We note that the severance remedy is not without
criticism. Justice Anderson in a
concurring opinion in Associated Builders
stated, “Severance of a challenged provision of a law found to be in
violation of Section 17 would defeat Section 17’s purpose and establish the
judiciary as a ‘super-legislature.’”
After acknowledging that reasoned argument, it is correct to say that,
under current law, it is preferable to sever the challenged “offending
amendment” rather than invalidate unchallenged provisions of the law or strike
down the entire session law. Associated Builders stands as a reminder
that, when possible, the judiciary should decide in favor of “a more pragmatic
result that is [still] consistent with our constitution” and avoid “the
draconian outcome of holding . . . that an unrelated provision in a law should
bring the whole law down.”
Here, the district court took the pragmatic approach, severing the PPA from chapter 28 and leaving the DNR bill as law. We agree that the PPA is plainly the disputed amendment that was attached to the DNR technical bill to assist the PPA’s passage through the Senate. The DNR technical provisions are not being litigated. It would overstep our judicial function to sever portions of article 1 for the purpose of upholding the PPA, where no party contested the constitutionality of the DNR provisions. That step by us could only be seen as a political commentary on the merits of the handgun carry bill. That is not for us; it is for the legislature.
We note that because of the various amendments to S.F. 842, the bill, in its final form (signed by the governor’s office), contained an article 2, denoting the PPA, and an article 3, with article 3 covering the firearms regulation provision as it applied to violent felons. Article 3 was not mentioned specifically by the district court in its order. Regardless, we find no dispute over the intent of the district court judge who signed the order now on appeal. The specific intent in the court’s order and accompanying memorandum was to find “[t]hat the [PPA] known as S.F. 842, violates Article 4, Section 17 of the Minnesota Constitution,” the single-subject provision.
Neither the district court’s order nor its memorandum broke down the PPA into article 2, handgun permitting, and article 3, violent felons in possession. What is clear is the district court’s intent to sever the PPA, having found it unconstitutional (on germaneness grounds) from the nongermane portion of the bill, meaning article 1, the DNR natural resources provisions. Although not mentioning article 3 by numerical name, we can only conclude the district court deemed article 3 part of the PPA for the purpose of its analysis. We will not assume the absurd result that the district court found article 2, the handgun carry portion, to be not germane to article 1, the DNR portion of the bill, but then went on to find article 3, the amendment to the PPA prohibiting the possession of firearms by certain felons, to be germane to article 1, the DNR provisions. It cannot be said that article 3 is germane to article 1 after a finding that article 2 is not.
We agree with the district court’s determination that severance was appropriate. Associated Builders recommends preserving as much of a law as possible out of deference to the Minnesota Legislature. That the district court did.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision to sever the PPA (articles 2 and 3) from chapter 28 and, thus, bring 2003 Minn. Laws. ch. 28 into constitutional compliance with Minn. Const. art. IV, § 17.
Freedom of Conscience
Appellant next argues that the district court’s comments addressing whether the PPA violates the Freedom of Conscience clause, Art. I, § 16, of the Minnesota Constitution are unreviewable dicta. Respondents agree with appellant that the district court’s comments are dicta and do not require an analysis. As such, respondents chose not to respond to appellant’s position that the dicta was not a correct expression of existing law.
Both appellant and respondents agree the district court did not rule that the PPA violated the Freedom of Conscience clause. The district court explained that it merely “[made] comment regarding [the conscience clause issue] to provide guidance to the Appellate Courts.” The district court opined that if it were to reach the issue, it would likely find the PPA unconstitutional on this ground also.
The district court found that, “The plaintiffs and intervening plaintiffs are unquestionably sincere in their [religious] beliefs.” The district court further stated that, “There is no question that the Act infringes upon those beliefs as it relates to the use of their properties,” and noted that, “The State . . . has not identified a compelling interest, which necessitates the infringement upon plaintiffs’ and intervening plaintiffs’ sincere beliefs.”
We recognize, as the district court did, that four of the respondents have raised a serious challenge to the PPA based on the Freedom of Conscience clause. All four religious institutions have either explicitly banned guns from their premises on religious grounds or operate with a general understanding that weapons are banned from the premises to further principles of non-violence and peace.
Respondents argued below that the PPA infringes on
their sincerely held beliefs by mandating that handgun carriers be allowed to
bring a gun into the church unless the church posts conspicuous signs and
verbally confronts their armed guests. See Minn. Stat. § 624.714, subds. 17(a),
(b), (f) (Supp. 2003). Respondents also
challenged portions of the PPA that disallow the churches from banning firearms
in their parking lots,
We agree with the district court that respondents’ arguments were squarely presented at the district court level. However, because we affirm the district court on the Minn. Const. art IV, § 17 issue, we decline to discuss respondents’ religious arguments on an advisory basis. See State v. Hickman, 666 N.W.2d 729, 733 (Minn. App. 2003) (holding that a party is not entitled to appellate review of an advisory opinion of the district court). There are other courts and other days.
The district court properly held that 2003 Minn. Laws ch. 28 violates the single-subject requirement of the Minnesota Constitution, art. IV, § 17.
The district court properly severed the Minnesota Citizens’ Personal Protection Act of 2003, chapter 28, to protect the remainder. We hold that both articles 2 and 3 of chapter 28 must be severed to bring chapter 28 into constitutional compliance.
The identical companion bill to H.F. 261, S.F. 222, was introduced in the
Senate on January 30, 2003, but was eventually withdrawn by its author from the
Crime Prevention and Public Safety Committee on March 20, 2003. State of
 Another group of religious
organizations filed a declaratory judgment action in
 Dissimilar or nongermaneness is the key word. That cannot be lost in all the smoke and mirrors that surround this debate. Legislation that someone claims is “log-rolling legislation” has always been permissible when similar subjects are united in one bill and the bill is passed by a combination of legislators, all of whom are united in wanting their part of the bill to go through.
 Although the Associated Builders court impliedly adopted the “mere filament” test in its holding, the test is not without criticism. Justice Paul Anderson in a concurring and dissenting opinion in Associated Builders stated, “While the ‘mere filament’ test has served this court for many years, its interpretation has now become so deferential as to render Section 17 ineffectual. Part I of the majority opinion correctly reflects the trend of our court’s decisions on Section 17 over the past 15 years and returns our court to its proper role in interpreting this section of our constitution, namely to give each part of the constitution the plain meaning and effect of its language.” 610 N.W.2d at 311.
 A “garbage bill” is
“legislation where, near the tail end of a session, a group of individual ideas
will be combined into one bill to wrap up the legislative business to avoid
acting separately on each.” State ex rel. Mattson v. Kiedrowski, 391
N.W.2d 777, 785 (
 The term has different
meanings, but is commonly used to describe noncontroversial standard
preliminary language or, in this case, noncontroversial various amendments that
would be too time consuming to put in separate bills. The proof of this is seen in the senate vote
of 65 to 0 on the original contents of article 1. When the
 Lifteau is also distinguishable because that case addressed a potential violation of the title requirement of article 4, section 17, in which “public awareness” is a critical factor, unlike in the single subject analysis. 270 N.W.2d at 753.
 Paragraphs 1-4 of the district court’s judgment dated July 13, 2004 inadvertently refer to the PPA as the “Minnesota Citizens Personal Protection Act of 2002.” It is clear from the parties’ arguments and other portions of the district court’s order that the district court was referring to the “Minnesota Citizens Personal Protection Act of 2003.” Paragraph 6 of the district court judgment inadvertently refers to the controlling constitutional provision as “Article 45, section 17.” All other parts of the order and the parties’ briefs agree the controlling section is Article 4, section 17—the single-subject provision.
 The particular respondents raising a Freedom of Conscience clause challenge are Unity Church of St. Paul, White Bear Unitarian Universalist Church, Gloria Dei Lutheran Church, and Eckankar.